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INTRODUCTION
Investor-state arbitration (ISA) has become the defining feature of
international investment law. ISA dominates public discussions and policy
debates that accompany the negotiation of new investment agreements; it forms
the lens through which investment law is analyzed and taught at universities; and
it has grown to be a significant area of practice for lawyers, arbitrators, and legal
service providers. Given its prominence, it is high time to ask just how influential
ISA has been in shaping the rules that make up international investment law.
International investment law is primarily based on over three thousand
international investment agreements (IIAs).1 Investment law scholars often
assert that states change these treaties in response to developments in investment
arbitration-although they typically disagree on whether to herald that change as
a long overdue "re-balancing" of rights and obligations or as an undesirable
1. See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015: REFORMING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
GOVERNANCE, UNCTAD 106 (2015), http://www.unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf.
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lowering of investment protection levels. 2 Apart from a few exceptions, 3
however, no serious empirical effort has been made to investigate the effect of
investment arbitration on IHA rulemaking. This is problematic. In the absence of
empirical knowledge, legal scholars, and investment policy makers are bound to
rely on potentially misleading anecdotal evidence to inform their normative
evaluations and policy assessments. A few vivid examples of states changing
their HAs in light of investment claims risk dominating the collective thinking,
while crucial yet latent trends at the intersection of arbitration and treaty
innovation are overlooked.
To place the current investment law and policy discourse on a more solid
empirical footing, this Article systematically investigates the impact of investor-
state arbitration on treaty-making via three channels. First, both historically and
in today's practice, not all investment treaties contain consent to investment
arbitration. So what can the absence or presence of an ISA clause tell us about
the design of an investment treaty more generally? Are states, for instance, more
willing to agree on tough investment protection in treaties that do not provide
consent to ISA because they know that these obligations cannot be effectively
enforced? Second, ISA may impact investment treaty design through claims.
When a country is subject to an investment claim or learns about investment
claims against other countries, it may adjust or "rebalance" its treaty design to
make it easier to defend against future investment cases. Third, ISA may
influence treaty design through the case law it generates. States may react to
awards either by endorsing a specific interpretation by an arbitral tribunal or by
explicitly rejecting it in future treaties.
This article assesses the impact of investment arbitration on rulemaking via
these three channels by using state-of-the-art information extraction techniques.
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), the IA regime has become "too big and complex to handle for
governments and investors alike."' Modem technology can help reduce that
complexity, opening up unprecedented avenues for large-scale empirical
2. On the rebalancing side, see Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between
Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 507 (2009); Suzanne A.
Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation ofInternational Investment Agreements, 13 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 1037 (2010); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 U.S. Model
BITs: Rebalancing Investor and Host Country Interests, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND POLICY 2008-2009, at 283 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009). On the lowering standards side, see Jos6
E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT'L L. 223 (2011); Stephen M. Schwebel, The United
States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: An Exercise in the Regressive Development of
International Law, in JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (2011).
3. For an assessment of ISA's impact on rulemaking, see Investor-state Dispute Settlement
and Impact on Investment Rulemaking, UNCTAD (2007), http://www.unctad.org/en/Docs
/iteiia20073_en.pdf. Yet, the report focuses exclusively on the impact of case law developments rather
than investigating the impact of claims themselves. Conversely, for a look at the impact of claims but not
of awards, see Mark S. Manger & Clint Peinhardt, Learning and Diffusion in International Investment
Agreements (7" Annual Conference on the Political Econ. of Int'l Org., Jan. 16-18, 2014), http://www.uni-
heidelberg.de/md/awi/peiolmangerpeinhardt_26.08.2013.pdf. No study comprehensively and
empirically investigates ISA's effect on rulemaking across its various impact channels.
4. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2011: NON-EQUITY MODES OF INTERNATIONAL
PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, UNCTAD (2011), http://www.unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary
/wir2011 en.pdf.
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research. Contributing to the emerging computational analysis of the
international investment regime,5 this Article employs machine-coding to
investigate close to 1700 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade
agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters across 55 recurring investment
treaty clauses. It finds that (1) the inclusion or omission of ISA has no material
effect on other treaty design elements, (2) countries do not systematically change
their IIAs in the face of investment claims and (3) developments in arbitral case
law have traceable repercussions on treaty design. These insights shed light on
several normative and policy debates within investment law.
First, recognizing that ISA clauses are mere procedural add-ons whose
omission or inclusion has no material effect on treaty design should put us on
guard not to overstate the transformative impact of investor-state arbitration. In
particular, the empirical finding weighs against viewing the inclusion of ISA as
creating substantive investor rights or as turning IIAs into the international
equivalent of a contract for the benefit of a third party. The analysis, rather,
suggests that ISA clauses merely provide an alternative procedural enforcement
right for investors, but otherwise leave the inter-state nature of the treaty's
substantive rights and obligations unaltered.
Second, the insight that investment claims have little impact on treaty
design should prompt us to view the current IIA landscape in a new light. The
"rebalancing" of rights and obligations in IIAs, long held as a product of rising
investment claims, actually predates the surge of claims and can be traced back
to NAFTA. The subsequent diffusion of NAFTA design elements is due to a
multiplicity of factors among which is NAFTA itself. By inspiring the first wave
of investment claims, NAFTA became entrenched as a template for future treaty-
making in a path dependent IIA universe. Investment claims also played a part
in helping to diffuse NAFTA treaty design, but with varying degrees of
importance: while the United States learned from NAFTA claims, transposing
its design to BITs, other countries like Canada, Germany, or Japan experienced
no equivalent effect. As those case studies show, bureaucratic inertia, public
awareness of ISA, and the interaction of investment and trade law were often
more important than claims in shaping treaty design outcomes. This insight is
both good and bad in legal policy terms. It is good because states have not reacted
to rising ISA claims by opportunistically altering their treaty design to escape
liability. But it is also bad because our findings point to a status quo bias in treaty-
making. While states have not overreacted to investment claims, as some
commentators feared, they may have actually done too little in response to a
changing policy environment, thus entrenching a pre-ISA claims architecture
rather than engaging in genuine innovation.
Finally, the finding that states systematically react to arbitral case law
points to the type of legal innovation that states do engage in. They fine-tune
existing treaty commitments in light of legal developments, investing in the
gradual adjustment of the field rather than its reinvention. Hence, as arbitral case
5. See Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Mapping the Universe ofInternational
Investment Agreements, 19 J. INT'L EcON. L. 1 (2016). For the corresponding website, see MAPPING BITS,
http://www.mappinginvestmenttreaties.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2016).
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law with quasi-precedential effect spreads, states actively intervene in ongoing
normative debates that play out in arbitration by changing their treaty design to
endorse or reject a strand of arbitral interpretations.
The study thus reveals that investment arbitration's impact on rulemaking
is surprisingly small and that other factors, including status quo bias and path
dependency, are more important determinants of (and obstacles to) treaty design
innovation and diffusion. The Article proceeds in three stages. The first
introduces investment treaties and arbitration and identifies the three channels by
which the latter may impact the former, drawing from the existing literature. The
second lays out the empirical methodology for measuring the impact of ISA on
treaty design. The third then applies that methodology to investment law, tracing
the evolution of IIAs generally before isolating the influence of the three impact
channels--clauses, claims and cases-on treaty design.
I. INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION
International investment law has become one of the most dynamic, but also
one of the most controversial, fields of international law. This Part briefly traces
the development of investment law and its investor-state arbitration component,
and then identifies the three channels by which arbitration may impact
international investment treaty-making.
A. The Development ofInvestment Law and Arbitration
Investment law originally developed from the customary international law
protection of foreign nationals abroad. In the nineteenth century, European states
and the United States argued that aliens were entitled to a minimum standard of
protection under international law.6 This minimum standard was initially hotly
contested by newly independent states in South America-in part because it
often served as pretense to justify foreign military interventions ("gunboat
diplomacy").7 By the early twentieth century, however, as inter-state arbitrations
began to gradually replace the use of force as primary means to enforce the
protection of foreign nationals, including investors, abroad, the minimum
standard gained credence and became a part of customary international law. 8
Contestation over the protection of foreign investors began anew in the second
half of the twentieth century.9 Decolonization and socialism placed emphasis on
6. Jonathan Gimblett & 0. Thomas Johnson, Jr., From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of
Modern International Investment Law, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY
2010-2011, at 650 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2011).
7. SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATiVE LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION I (2009).
8. The most famous decision on the minimum standard of treatment is L.F.H. Neer and Pauline
Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 60 (Oct. 15, 1926). Neer continues to be widely cited
by investment tribunals to describe the scope of the international minimum standard. On the minimum
standard, see generally MARTINS PAPARINSKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD AND FAIR
AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT (2013).
9. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 21-28 (3d ed.
2010); SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND PRINCIPLE 67
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sovereign control over natural resources, which often conflicted with existing
foreign ownership rights.'o The ensuing waves of expropriation combined with
a series of United Nations resolutions on a "New International Economic Order"
challenged the customary rules on the protection of aliens, including the level of
compensation owed to foreign investors in case of an expropriation." Developed
countries responded in two ways. First, they began codifying the protection of
foreign investors by signing bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with like-minded
developing countries.' 2 Second, they promoted the establishment of an
international arbitration mechanism that would depoliticize foreign investment
relations by allowing private investors to bring their claims directly against host
states before international arbitration tribunals.II The latter efforts culminated in
the conclusion of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID) in 1965 under the auspices
of the World Bank.'4
Following the end of the Cold War, contestation gave way to a global
acceptance of investment protection and arbitration.' 5 Today virtually every
country is signatory to at least one of the around 3,000 bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) and several hundred free trade agreements (FTAs) with
investment chapters that have been signed since the 1960s.1 6 Most of these
agreements provide consent to investor-state arbitration, be it under ICSID or
another forum. ' Treaty-based ISA, however, lay largely dormant until the mid-
1990s. Since then, investors have brought over 600 cases pursuant to investment
treaties.' 8 If successful, the respondent state is liable to pay damages.' 9 Such
damage awards benefit from the strong recognition and enforcement
(2008); KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND
INTERPRETATION 48 (2010).
10. Gimblett & Johnson, Jr., supra note 6, at 669-81.
I1. G.A. Res. 3281, art. 2(2)(c) (Dec. 12, 1974); G.A. Res. 3201 (May 1, 1974); G.A. Res. 1803
(Dec. 14, 1962).
12. Jeswald W. Salacuse, Treatification ofInternational Investment Law, 13 LAW & BUS. REV.
AM. 155, 156 (2007); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Brief History of International Investment Agreements, A,
12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL. 157, 168 (2005).
13. See ARON BROCHES, SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK, ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 (1995); Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Toward a Greater
Depoliticization ofInvestment Disputes: The Roles ofICSID and MIGA, in INVESTING WITH CONFIDENCE:
UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (Kevin W. Lu et al. eds.,
2009). See generally ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID (2012).
14. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States art. 25(1), opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention].
15. Vandevelde, supra note 12, at 175-77.
16. UNCTAD, supra note 1, at 106.
17. Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study ofBilateral Investment
Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 405, 423-29 (2007).
18. World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, UNCTAD 124
(2014), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf.
19. IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW (2009); Alan 0. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International Economic
Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631 (2005); Wolfgang Alschner, Aligning Loss and
Liability-Towards an Integrated Assessment of Damages in Investment Arbitration, in THE USE OF
ECONOMICS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES: LESSONS LEARNED AND CHALLENGES AHEAD
(Theresa Carpenter et al. eds., forthcoming 2017).
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infrastructure of the ICSID Convention (for ICSID awards) and the 1958 New
York Convention (for non-ICSID awards) and can thus effectively attach host
state assets around the world not protected by sovereign immunity.20
Through its effectiveness, investment arbitration has become a cornerstone
of today's investment law architecture and has transformed the way we think
about the field. Investment law scholars today spend most of their time making
sense of arbitral case law rather than interpreting investment treaties, contracts,
or domestic law. Similarly, university courses are taught on "investment
arbitration" rather than "investment law" to prepare students for an increasingly
litigation-focused area of practice. While ISA makes investment law attractive
for scholars and practitioners, it also makes investment law controversial. Some
investment arbitration claims have challenged sensitive areas of public policy
giving rise to fears that investment treaties and arbitration could compromise the
state's ability to regulate in the public interest, leading to "regulatory chill." 21
Furthermore, the ad hoc structure of arbitration modeled on commercial
arbitration, its (partial) secrecy, and the relatively small pool of practitioners with
revolving roles as negotiators, arbitrators, and counsels have attracted academic
and public criticism.22 ISA has thereby become a publicly debated and contested
element of investment law.
Given its prominence among proponents and critics, the question arises:
just how much of today's investment law is owed to investor-state arbitration?
While it is beyond doubt that ISA has revolutionized the litigation of investment
disputes, it is much less clear to what extent it has also changed the substance of
HAs that form the underpinning of today's investment law architecture.
Prominent commentators have argued that investment arbitration has
transformed the substantive nature of HAs. Thomas Widlde, for instance,
suggested that the inclusion of ISA "fundamentally changed the character of
BITs."2 3 Similarly, Michael Reisman stated that ISA turned BITs into "treaties
for the benefit of third parties."2 4 Joost Pauwelyn argues that ISA "fundamentally
20. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 310-12 (2d ed. 2012).
21. See, e.g., Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from
Political Science, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606 (Chester Brown
& Kate Miles eds., 2011); Stephan W. Schill, Do Investment Treaties Chill Unilateral State Regulation
To Mitigate Climate Change?, 24 J. INT'L ARB. 469 (2007). Perhaps the most notorious cases against
public interest regulations involve Philip Morris' legal actions to impede tobacco control legislation. See
Philip Morris Brand Sarl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of
Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award (Jul. 8, 2016); Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The
Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award (Dec. 17, 2015).
22. GUs VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); Pia
Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers Are
Fueling an Investment Arbitration Boom, CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY & TRANSNATIONAL INST. (2012),
www.tni.org/files/download/profitingfrominjustice.pdf.
23. Thomas W. Wdlde, Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER 724, 748 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).
24. Republic of Ecuador v. United States of America, PCA Case No. 2012-5, Expert Opinion
with Respect to Jurisdiction, Prof. W. Michael Reisman, 13 (Apr. 24,2012) [hereinafter Ecuador v. United
States Expert Opinion].
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transformed the rules on foreign investment protection" 25 and introduces a
distinction between generations of BITs depending on whether consent to ISA is
included.26 For Ole Spiermann, the insertion of ISA into modem BITs even
"vest[s] rights in private investors as subjects of international law." 27 More than
just creating another enforcement route, ISA, according to them, thus seems to
have altered the substance of international investment law.
In addition, there is widespread agreement in the literature that ISA has
triggered a major overhaul of IIAs across the globe over the past decade. The
proliferation of ISA claims is said to have created a "backlash against investment
arbitration" 28 and, according to UNCTAD, "led to the emergence of 'new
generation' IIAs." 29 This "new generation" places greater emphasis on host state
policy flexibility and non-investment values than earlier agreements.3 0 The
evidence for widespread treaty design reform in response to the proliferation of
investment claims is largely anecdotal, however. Commentators routinely invoke
the United States' experience pointing to the stark differences between the pre-
arbitration-claims 1994 U.S. model BIT and the post-arbitration-claims 2004
model BIT in making the case for a strong impact of arbitration on rulemaking.3 '
Scholars thereby risk jumping from correlation to causation attributing treaty
design innovations that co-occur with the proliferation of investment claims to
the latter.32 Furthermore, it is unclear how representative the U.S. case is for
developments in the wider HA universe. While a major reform of HAs seems
underway with the EU proposing a new investment court system33 and countries
25. Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos: Foreign Investment Law As a Complex Adaptive
System, How It Emerged and How It Can Be Reformed, 29 ICSID REv. 372, 395-96 (2014).
26. Id.; see also Axel Berger et al., More Stringent BITs, Less Ambiguous Effects on FDI? Not
a Bit! (Kiel Inst. World Econ., Working Paper No. 1621, 2010), https://www.ifw-members.ifw-
kiel.de/publications/more-stringent-bits-less-ambiguous-effects-on-fdi-not-a-bit/kwp_1621.pdf.; Yackee,
supra note 17.
27. Ole Spiermann, Twentieth Century Internationalism in Law, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 785, 811
(2007).
28. Michael Waibel et al., The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and
Reality, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION xxxvi (Michael Waibel & Asha Kaushal
eds., 2010).
29. World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for
Development, UNCTAD 107 (2013), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013 en.pdf; see also
Peinhardt & Manger, supra note 3, at 3 ("many states have begun to rethink their investment treaty
commitments after appearing before international tribunals").
30. World Investment Report 2012: Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies,
UNCTAD 101-02 (2012), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2O12_embargoed-en.pdf; Spears,
supra note 2.
31. Manger & Peinhardt, supra note 3, at 3; Schwebel, supra note 2, at 152; Vandevelde, supra
note 2, at 283; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Model Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Way Forward, 18 Sw.
J. INT'L L. 307, 309-12 (2011).
32. See Roberto Echandi, A New Generation of International Investment Agreements in the
Americas: Impact ofInvestor-State Dispute Settlement over Investment Rule-Making, in FOURTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE OF THE EURO-LATIN STUDY NETWORK ON INTEGRATION AND TRADE (ELSNIT) (2006)
(listing innovations following ISA claims without systematically investigating their origins); see also
UNCTAD, supra note 3.
33. Press Release, European Commission, EU Finalises Proposal for Investment Protection and
Court System for TTIP (Nov. 12, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-15-6059_en.htm. Other
authors have made similar proposals. See, e.g., Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment
Court (Soc. of Int'l Econ. L., Inaugural Conference, 2008), http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.cal
all-papers/259.
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such as India revamping their model BITs, 34 at the time of writing these far-
reaching changes remain to be implemented. Widespread talk of reform thus
tends to detract from investigations into how much concluded agreements have
in fact changed since the rise of investment arbitration. A case in point is the
investment chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, which has
been advertised as a "new, gold standard," yet over 80 percent of the chapter
simply reproduces the language of a prior 2006 U.S. agreement and contains few
genuine innovations. 35 In short, ISA is often perceived as transformative of IIAs,
but we actually do not know how transformative it has actually been.
B. Three Impact Channels
This Article empirically investigates ISA's impact on investment treaty-
making in order to answer that question. More specifically, it focuses on three
channels through which ISA could have affected the design of international
investment agreements: (1) investment arbitration clauses, (2) investment
arbitration claims, and (3) investment arbitration case law.
1. Investment Arbitration Clauses
The first way by which ISA may have impacted IIA design is through its
mere inclusion. Before the late 1960s, the enforcement of international
investment law was exclusively an inter-state affair.36 The law of diplomatic
protection as part of customary international law translated injuries against
foreign nationals into injuries against their home state, turning investor-state
disputes into inter-state disputes. 37 Accordingly, early investment treaties
exclusively provided for state-to-state dispute settlement clauses.38 The situation
changed dramatically in the 1960s when the ICSID Convention was signed and
HAs, starting with the Netherlands-Indonesia BIT (1968), began to include
consent to its jurisdiction or to alternative investor-state arbitration
mechanisms.39 By allowing private investors to directly sue host states for treaty
34. Ashutosh Ray, Unveiled: Indian Model BIT, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Jan. 18, 2016),
http:/ikluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/01/1 8/unveiled-indian-model-bit/.
35. Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, The New Gold Standard? Empirically
Situating the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the Investment Treaty Universe, 17 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE
339 (2016); see also Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs, The TPP's Investment Chapter: Entrenching, Rather
than Reforming, a Flawed System, COLUM. CTR. SUSTAINABLE INV. (2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/
files/2015/11I/TPP-entrenching-flaws-21-Nov-FINAL.pdf.
36. Wolfgang Alschner, The Return of the Home State and the Rise of "Embedded" Investor-
State Arbitration, in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN [NVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 293, 298-99 (Shaheeza
Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco eds., 2015).
37. In the 1960s, Belgium, for instance, brought a diplomatic protection claim on behalf of
Belgian investors against Spain before the International Court of Justice, alleging that Spain's acts vis-A-
vis an electricity provider, which was mostly owned by Belgian shareholders, violated international law.
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J., IN 45-46, 54 (Feb.
5). See generally EDWIN MONTEFIORE BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD:
OR, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS (1915).
38. American Friendship Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaties and early European BITs
delegated the settlement of investment disputes either to the International Court of Justice or to ad hoc
inter-state arbitration.
39. Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 395-97.
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violations, ISA stripped away the political and diplomatic considerations that had
hitherto prevented many investor-state disputes from rising to the level of inter-
state disputes, making the enforcement of treaty violations and the ensuing
payment of damages more credible and more likely.
The decision to create treaty-based ISA in the 1960s is nothing short of
astonishing. During the 1960s, even in deep integration projects such as the
European Community (EC), states were reluctant to provide individuals with a
direct means of supranational law enforcement. It took the European Court of
Justice's judgments to find a direct effect of EC law implied in the original EC
treaty.4 0 Indeed, even by today's standards, investment law's innovation in the
1960s seems remarkable given that compulsory adjudication of international law,
let alone compulsory adjudication initiated by private parties as opposed to
states, continues to be the exception rather than the rule. One thus has to wonder
whether the quite radical innovation to create such a powerful and innovative
enforcement mechanism was accompanied by an equally radical innovation in
treaty design more generally.
ISA clauses could have affected treaty design both substantively and
procedurally. On the substantive side, ISA clauses could have led to a lowering
of investment protection levels: while states may have been ready to tie their
hands to tough commitments when they knew that they were unlikely to be
enforced-few inter-state investment disputes had ever been brought-they may
have been more cautious if they expected to actually be held to these standards.
Hence, following this line of thought, one would expect to observe either a
decrease in the number of obligations or an increase of the number of exceptions
in IIAs with ISA as compared to HAs without ISA.
On the procedural side, one could expect that if states consented to the
radical step of being sued by private actors before an international compulsory
arbitration mechanism issuing binding monetary awards, they would also add
procedural safeguards to mitigate the sovereignty impact of this choice. In the
WTO context, for instance, the gradual progression from a diplomatic to a more
judicial dispute settlement architecture was accompanied by a simultaneous
infusion of more politics into the GATT/WTO machinery. According to Joost
Pauwelyn, "more discipline and harder law (less exit) lead to and require more
politics and higher levels of participation (more voice)."41 The WTO rules
governing amicable settlements are an example of this bidirectional interaction
of law and politics. As legalization increased, the references to disputing parties'
freedom to avoid formal dispute settlement and resolve the matter bilaterally also
increased to the point that in today's quasi-automatic and highly judicial WTO
40. In its 1963 seminal judgment Van Gend en Loos, the ECJ found that a direct effect of EC
law was implied in the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1. As Paul Craig and Grainne de B6rca explain,
"The strong interventions made on behalf of three governments [in Van Gen den Loos], half of the existing
Member States, indicated that the concept of direct effect, understood as the immediate enforceability by
individual applicants of those provisions in national courts, probably did not accord with the
understanding of those states of the obligations they assumed when they created the EEC." PAUL CRAIG
& GRAINNE DE BORCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 185 (2011).
41. Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005).
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dispute settlement system, a "solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a
dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred."42
Applied to the investment law context, we should expect similar procedural
safeguards to accompany the inclusion of ISA in order to ensure that the
contracting states have some voice and scope for politics in an otherwise highly
legalized architecture. Ex ante controls embedding contracting states'
preferences could carefully circumscribe the arbitration procedure. Ex post
controls would allow the contracting states or other outside interests to monitor
and weigh in on the tribunal's interpretation or analysis in ongoing disputes. If
anything, giving private actors a direct cause of action seems to warrant an even
stronger role of such elements than in the inter-state WTO context. Hence, it is
reasonable to expect that ISA may have had an impact both on the substantive
and the procedural content of investment treaties.
2. Investment Arbitration Claims
A second way by which ISA may have impacted IIA design is through
investment claims. ISA clauses lay largely dormant for over 20 years. It was only
in 1987 that an investor for the first time relied on state consent given in an
investment treaty to initiate an ISA claim in AAPL v. Sri Lanka.43 It then took
another 15 years before ISA became a more frequent means of recourse with
more than 25 cases filed per year starting in 2002." Given this large gap before
the law in the books turned into law in action, investment claims could constitute
a second impact channel on treaty design separate from investment clauses.
Considering claims as unique impact channels finds support in the
literature. Several scholars have argued that states had not fully grasped the
liability implications of ISA clauses when they were first introduced and only
understood their full potential when ISA claims began to proliferate. Lauge
Poulsen's empirical research on BIT diffusion convincingly shows that
developing countries systematically underestimated the costs of IIAs and
overestimated their benefits, taking BITs for simple "photo-opportunities" and
mere "ink on paper." 45 Similarly, Christoph Schreuer stated in an expert opinion
that developing countries often "had no idea that [BITs] would have real
consequences in the real world." 46 In addition, commentators have also
42. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.7, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S.
401; see also Wolfgang Alschner, Amicable Settlements of WTO Disputes: Bilateral Solutions in a
Multilateral System, 13 WORLD TRADE REv. 65 (2014).
43. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3,
Award (June 27, 1990) [hereinafter AAPL Award].
44. See Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (last visited Aug. 15, 2016).
45. LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY:
THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2015); Lauge Poulsen, The Politics
of South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 186
(T. Broude et al. eds., 2011); Lauge Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and the Diffusion of Modern Investment
Treaties, 58 INT'L STUD. Q. 1 (2013).
46. Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/14, Final
Award, 1 85 (Dec. 8, 2008) (quoting expert testimony of Professor Christoph Schreuer).
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suggested that prior to the first investment claims, even developed countries
could not have understood the full potential of ISA. Pauwelyn has argued that
the idea of "arbitration without privity," 47 which today allows an investor to
perfect an arbitration agreement with the host state by simply accepting an offer
of consent unilaterally given by the host state in the investment treaty, was a
largely unanticipated, and initially controversial, legal innovation first accepted
by the AAPL tribunal in 1990.48 If both developing and developed countries were
surprised by investment claims, we could expect that they altered their treaty
design in response to mitigate the impact of ISA on state sovereignty.
There is a rich literature, albeit rarely empirical in nature, which addresses
countries' efforts to "rebalance" investment treaties in response to investment
claims-sometimes framed as a "backlash against arbitration." 49 The common
theme of this literature is that investment claims exposed a substantive tension
between investment protection obligations and states' regulatory powers, as well
as procedural shortcomings in the arbitral process, such as a lack of public
participation.5 0 In response, it is argued, states have included public policy
exceptions into their investment treaties and refined the investment arbitration
architecture to curb arbitral discretion and to allow for more involvement of
outside interests.5 1 Following this literature, it is reasonable to expect states to
have reacted to investment claims by adapting their treaty design, adding policy
exceptions and procedural safeguards.
3. Investment Arbitration Case Law
A final way by which ISA may have impacted IIA design is through the
case law it generates. As a corollary of their adjudicative functions, investment
tribunals have to interpret the often vaguely phrased provisions in investment
treaties. Investment tribunals thus exercise a de facto lawmaking role, filling the
normative gaps left open by the treaty drafters. 52 While delegation of interpretive
power to tribunals saves negotiation costs ex ante, it can lead to ex post costs if
third-party interpreters wrongly arrive at an interpretation unintended by the
contracting parties. 53 These costs of delegation are especially great if decisions
by third-party adjudicators have de facto lawmaking power. Although there is no
formal rule of precedent in investment law, parties and tribunals abundantly refer
to prior arbitral interpretations in subsequent cases, including but not limited to
47. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REv. 232 (1995).
48. Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 400.
49. See supra note 2; see also Waibel et al., supra note 28.
50. See supra note 2.
51. Id.
52. Instead of investing time and effort at the negotiation stage to anticipate future
developments, states are often better off delegating normative gap-filling to third-party adjudicators. This
is a basic insight of contract theory applied to treaties. See, e.g., SIMON A. B. SCHROPP, TRADE POLICY
FLEXIBILITY AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: A LAW AND ECONOMICS
ANALYSIS 96-97 (2009).
53. Interpretation of H1As: What Sates Can Do, UNCTAD (Dec.
2011), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20l1d10_.en.pdf.; Anne van Aaken, Delegating Interpretative
Authority in Investment Treaties: The Case ofJoint Commissions, 11 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 1 (2014).
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disputes involving the same treaty. 54 This practice has given rise to a sort of
"investment common law"-a body of investment case law that is widely used
to elucidate the meaning of core IIA provisions across treaties.55
The existence of a parallel judge-made rulemaking process may impact
how states as primary lawmakers design their treaties. Where they disagree with
arbitral interpretations, states can use their normative powers to contract
explicitly out of arbitral case law.56 Although states are unlikely to react to all
arbitral pronouncements, they are likely to take sides in controversial debates
that arise in case law and that critically affect the reading of their agreements. On
rare occasions, for example, states have issued binding interpretations of existing
treaties: a well-known example is the parties' interpretive note on the meaning
of NAFTA Article 1105 regarding the minimum standard of treatment.5 1 More
often, however, arbitral interpretations may be factored in when new agreements
are negotiated.5 8
Aside from contracting out of arbitral case law, states can also explicitly
endorse an arbitral interpretation. Where arbitrators resolve a difficult issue not
anticipated by the drafters, their interpretation may serve as a template in future
treaty-making. In a seminal piece, Thomas Schelling showed that "focal points"
incentivize players to choose one outcome over another in coordination games
involving several possible equilibria. 9 In negotiations over new treaties, prior
jurisprudence can constitute such a focal point leading to a convergence of views
and corresponding changes in treaty design. Garrett and Weingast, for instance,
use Schelling's framework to explain why the European Community member
states chose the European Court of Justice's jurisprudence as a template for
designing their single market rules rather than devising new rules from scratch.6o
In the same vein, contracting states to investment treaties may opt into solutions
54. O. K. Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning oflCSID Tribunals -An Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 301 (2008).
55. Florian Grisel, The Sources of Foreign Investment Law, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 213, 223-33 (Zachary Douglas et
al. eds., 2014); M.C. Porterfield, An International Common Law of Investors Rights, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 79 (2006).
56. See Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation, 104 AM.
J. INT'L L. 179 (2010); UNCTAD, supra note 53.
57. North American Free Trade Agreement: Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions, NAFTA FREE TRADE COMM'N (July 31, 2011), http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/
Commission/CH1 Iunderstanding.e.asp.
The decision has attracted rich and critical commentary. See, e.g., Charles H. Brower II, Why the FTC
Notes of Interpretation Constitute a Partial Amendment of NAFTA Article 1105, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 347
(2005); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Interpretive Powers of the Free Trade Commission and the Rule of
Law, in FIFTEEN YEARS OF NAFTA CHAPTER 11 ARBITRATION 175 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Fr6d6ric
Bachand eds., 2011).
58. For example, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission's Notes of Interpretation of Certain
Chapter 11 Provisions was integrated into subsequent BITs including those by the United States, Canada,
and Mexico. See, e.g., 2004 U.S. Model BIT at art. 5 and Annex; Agreement Between the Czech Republic
and the United Mexican States on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Czech-Mex.,
art. 2, Apr. 4, 2002, 2449 U.N.T.S. 149.
59. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 2 (1980).
60. Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the
European Community's Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 173 (Judith Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1993).
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devised in prior arbitral case law to solve problems not explicitly addressed in
their earlier treaties. With states endorsing or rejecting arbitral interpretations,
investment case law may constitute a third channel by which ISA impacts the
design of IIAs.
II. METHODOLOGY
Using state-of-the-art empirical tools, we can trace and measure the impact
of investment arbitration on treaty design through these three channels. This Part
presents the dataset of treaties investigated, explains the content-analysis tools
used to extract legally relevant information from these texts, and introduces the
methods for analyzing ISA's impact on treaty design.
A. The Dataset
To trace change in treaty content, this Article relies on the
Alschner/Skougarevskiy (2015) dataset, which is the most comprehensive
collection of English language BIT full texts to date.61 It comprises 1,628 English
language BITs collected from the Kluwer Arbitration, Investment Claims, and
UNCTAD investment policy hub websites amounting to 51% of the entire
universe of signed BITs.62 The dataset spans from 1959 (Germany-Pakistan
BIT) to 2014 and covers 171 countries. In spite of its breadth, the dataset under-
samples two groups of signatories. First, it only captures a comparatively small
portion of BITs signed by low-income countries, which, in part, is due to the fact
that these countries publish their BIT full texts less frequently than higher income
countries. Second, the majority of France's BITs are not included in the dataset,
since it comprises English language treaties only.
Even though the sample is not fully representative of the entire population
of BITs, there are three reasons why this subset of treaties still allows us to make
persuasive inferences on the entire BIT population. First, although it only
contains English BITs, many non-English-speaking countries negotiate English
language treaties or agree on an equally authentic English text in addition to a
version in their native language. Often, the English version even trumps the
native language version in case of an inconsistency.63 Second, BITs are highly
homogenous texts, which closely follow common model treaties and multilateral
draft conventions such as the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of
Foreign Property.' These common roots make it less likely that BITs outside
61. Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 5, at 7.
62. Id.
63. For instance, the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the
Government of Ukraine for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Croat.-Ukr., Dec.
15, 1997, UNCTAD INV. POL'Y HUB, provides that "[i]f there is any divergence in interpretation, the
English version shall prevail." Similar formulations can be found, for example, in the Agreement Between
the Swiss Confederation and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, Jordan-Switz., Feb. 25, 2001, 1128 U.N.T.S. 82; see also Agreement on
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey
and the Government of the Republic of Iran, Iran-Turk., Dec. 21, 1996, UNCTAD INv. POL'Y HUB (2003).
64. STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
39-40 (2009).
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our sample are substantially different from those within it. Third, even though
there may be a selection bias in reporting with some countries publishing the full
texts of all their treaties, while others do not, this bias is mitigated by the bilateral
nature of the treaties-BITs from virtually every country are in our dataset.
Taken together these three factors make it less likely that the unreported or
foreign language texts contain treaty features not also present in our sample.
Supplementing the 1628 BITs, this Article also includes fifty-two free trade
agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters, such as NAFTA, identified from
the WTO list of regional trade agreements6 5 and six multilateral investment
agreements such as the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement
identified through UNCTAD's other IIA list.66 Not included are agreements that
are not substantively equivalent to BITs, for example, FTAs that do not contain
both relative (e.g. national treatment) and absolute (e.g. expropriation)
investment protection clauses, and subject-specific investment agreements such
as the Energy Charter. In total, our dataset thus comprises close to 1,700 IIAs.
Finally, data on treaty-based investment claims is taken from UNCTAD's
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) database.67 At the time of writing, the
database comprised 561 cases spanning from 1987 to 2013.
B. Coding of Treaty Features
To track the changing legal content of IIAs in our database, the Article
relies on an automated content analysis using machine-coding based on a
dictionary of treaty provisions.
1. Codebook of Treaty Provisions
International law textbooks emphasize that investment treaties contain a set
of core elements. Dolzer and Schreuer refer to common "principles of
international investment law."68 Montt describes the BIT universe as "a system
that contains thousands of investment treaties, all having substantive provisions
worded in closely similar terms." 69 For Salacuse, BITs form a global regime of
investment protection characterized by common principles, norms, rules, and
65. The Regional Trade Agreements Information System, WTO,
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx (last visited May 12, 2014). This database only
lists regional trade agreements notified to the WTO.
66. UNCTAD uses the label "Other HAs" to collect various types of agreements including
investment framework agreements (e.g. Chile-India Framework Agreement (2005)), treaties with limited
investment-related provisions (e.g. EFTA-Peru FTA (2010), Chapter 5), and agreements with fully-
fledged investment provisions (e.g. NAFTA (1992)). We only use the third group to add non-FTA
investment treaties. See Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, UNCTAD,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (last visited Aug. 15, 2016) for terminological distinction
and other examples.
67. Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub
.unctad.org/ISDS (last visited Aug. 15, 2016).
68. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 20.
69. MONTr, supra note 7, at 19.
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decision-making processes.70 In short, there is considerable uniformity in the
terms of recurring investment protection clauses.
The uniformity across treaties facilitates the creation of a codebook of
frequently encountered clauses. For this Article, we devised an original
codebook comprising fifty-five core investment treaty features relating to three
dimensions of IIAs: (1) investment protection, (2) exceptions, and (3) investor-
state arbitration. To identify representative clauses and their variation, we
consulted investment law textbooks, reports by international organizations,7 1
BIT model agreements and commentaries, 72 as well as concluded IIA texts. The
list regroups the fifteen most common investment protection obligations found
in HAs, a range of twenty-three treaty exemptions, carve-outs, and exceptions
that limit the scope of these obligations typically vis-d-vis non-investment
values, and seventeen investor-state arbitration features that curb arbitral
discretion either ex ante or ex post, reserving control for the contracting parties
and outside interests. The specific coding features and coding process are
detailed in Annex 1.
2. Representation of Treaty Design
The coding results are used in three different ways to represent treaty
design. First, in its raw form, the coding allows us to depict the occurrence of
specific treaty features and their changing prevalence over time. We can thus
trace, for instance, when general public policy exceptions modeled on Article
XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were introduced
into the IIA universe and how they proliferated over time. Second, we can
aggregate individual treaty features into their larger categories, i.e. protection,
exception, and arbitration, to calculate how many treaty features per category
occur in a given treaty and compare that figure across agreements. Third, we can
calculate the cumulative score either of the total features per treaty or its
substantive (protection and exception) and procedural (arbitration) components
to get a sense of a treaty's scope. These three different representations of our
coding results thus allow us to produce fine-grained comparisons between
agreements.
C. Research Design
We use our representation of treaty design to investigate the effect of
investment arbitration on rulemaking using both quantitative and qualitative
tools. Part III begins with a descriptive quantitative analysis of treaty design to
70. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES (2010); Jeswald W.
Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 427, 431 (2010).
71. International Investment Arrangements: Trends and Emerging Issues, UNCTAD (2006),
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit2005l Len.pdf; Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in
Investment Rulemaking, UNCTAD (2007), http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf; Identifying Core
Elements in Investment Agreements in the APEC Region, UNCTAD (2008),
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20083_en.pdf; International Investment Rule Making: Stocktaking
Challenges and the Way Forward, UNCTAD (2008), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit20073_en.pdf.
72. CHESTER BROWN & DEVASHISH KRISHAN, COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL
INVESTMENT TREATIES (2013).
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set the stage for our causal assessment of clauses, claims, and case law in Parts
IV to VI. In Part IV, we present quantitative evidence, including a regression
analysis, to trace the effect of investment clauses on other treaty design elements.
Statistical tools, however, are less effective when applied to the impact of claims
or case law. As will be further elaborated below, the impact of investment claims
tends to be obscured by bidirectional causation as well as intervening or
supervening variables difficult to control for in statistical analysis. Investment
awards, in turn, are not amenable to regression or event studies as they tend to
impact investment treaty-making only in the aggregate. Controversial cases
spark arbitral disagreement that lead to the creation of different jurisprudential
camps, to which states then react through treaty-making. Accordingly, Parts V
and VI rely more heavily on contextual, qualitative assessments and case studies
to reveal the impact of claims and case law on treaty design.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF INVESTMENT TREATY DESIGN
In this Part we begin by empirically tracing how investment treaty law has
changed over time. This analysis creates the basis for our subsequent efforts to
attribute treaty design changes to investment clauses, claims, and cases.
A. Evolving Investment Treaty Design
Investment treaties have changed quite drastically since their inception.
Figure 1 traces that change using two different proxies: (1) IIA length (in
character count) and (2) annual average treaty scores based on fifty-five coded
clauses indexed by 2013 values. The figure shows first that the cumulative count
of treaty features is highly correlated (0.95) with treaty length. As can be seen in
Figure 1, both proxies of treaty design evolve almost identically. This suggests
that our coding of treaty design features captures the changing scope of treaties
well without omitting material changes. Second, the figure shows that
agreements have gradually increased in length and scope at least since the 1980s,
with the pace picking up significantly in the last decade.
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Figure 1: Annual average scores of treaty length and coded features between 1959
and 2013 (7ndex Basis: 2013 values)
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Note: The figure displays annual average scores of 1686 lAs concluded between 1959 and 2013. The
length of a treaty (or investment chapter) is measured by the number of characters it contains. The
number of coded treaty features is the cumulative count of fifty-five coded features per treaty. The
annual average is calculated and yearly results are indexed between 0 and I as shares of 2013 values. To
better understand what lies behind these changes we need to distinguish between two separate processes:
the first appearance of a novel treaty feature and its diffusion in the IA universe.
B. Mind the Gap: The Crucial Difference Between Treaty Innovation
and Diffusion
Treaty design innovation and treaty design diffusion are two separate
processes. They need not co-occur in time, nor are they necessarily determined
by the same causal factors. That is why it is crucial to investigate them separately.
Beginning with the inclusion of new features, Figure 2 identifies when the
fifty-five treaty features for which we code first appeared in the investment treaty
universe and displays them as cumulative count per year and by treaty dimension.
It shows that the evolution of IIA treaty design proceeded in several phases. The
first period corresponds to the origins and early days of the IIA universe. The
second coincides with the United States' entry into the BIT universe in the early
1980s.73 Both of these periods are dominated mostly by the additions of
protective clauses.
73. For a detailed analysis of the impact of the United States' entry, see Wolfgang Alschner,
Americanization of the BIT Universe: The Influence ofFriendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN)
Treaties on Modern Investment Treaty Law, 5 GOETTINGEN J. INT'L L. 455 (2013).
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Note: The figure displays treaty features based on the year oftheir first inclusion. Features are
aggregated by category. In 1992, for instance, nine new exception features and eight new arbitration
features appeared in the H1A universe.
The two latest periods of concentrated innovation--ne in the early 1990s
and one in the early 2000s-consist primarily of the introduction of new
exceptions and investment arbitration control mechanisms. Table 1 lists the
individual elements introduced in periods three and four. With respect to the
features appearing in the early 1990s, on the exceptions side, we see efforts being
made to harmonize normative conflicts between investment protection and non-
investment values, from environmental protection to macro-economic policy. On
the arbitration side, we see that states include procedural ex ante and ex post
controls in their treaties. From the notice of intent that marks the beginning of
the arbitration to the limitation of remedies at its end, we see that states define
the arbitration process ex ante. In addition, contracting states begin to reserve
control mechanisms ex post through authoritative interpretations, the return of
certain questions of law and fact to the state parties, and the possibility of
intervening in the arbitration process as a non-disputing state party.
Table 1: Exception and arbitration features appearing in the latest two periods of
innovation depicted in Figure 2 above
Third Period of Innovation: Early 1990s
Exceptions Arbitration
Compulsory License Carve-out Notice of Intent
Creditor Protection Loss or Damage
Culture Limitation Periods for Claims
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Environmental Measures Clause
GATT XX
Exchange Rate Measures Carve-out
Prudential Measures Carve-out
Subsidies Carve-out
Waiver of Other Proceedings
Consolidation
Closed List of Remedies
Authoritative Interpretation
Renvoi to State Parties
State-party Participation
Fourth Period of Innovation: Early 2000s
Exceptions
Indirect FET Breach Carve-out
MFN Non-application to ISA
Bona Fide Taking Carve-out
Indirect Expropriation Definition
Investment Characteristics





Comment Procedure on Draft Award
Appellate Mechanism Proposal
In comparison to these extensive and quite radical changes, the elements
that prevailed during the fourth period constitute targeted refinements. On the
exception side, we see efforts to clarify key treaty provisions, from the definition
of investment to the scope and content of fair and equitable treatment (FET),
most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses, or expropriation. On the arbitration side, we
see an integration of outside interests into the arbitration process through
transparent proceedings and amicus curiae submissions, in addition to an
increase in state control mechanisms such as comment procedures for draft
awards and appellate review proposals.
Shifting from the first inclusion of these treaty design features to their
proliferation, we see important differences, but also common trends. Figure 3
traces the evolution of the coded treaty design dimensions-protection,
exception, and arbitration-over time. All three dimensions display a small but
gradual growth over time. Protection scores increased particularly in the 1970s
and 80s, as well as over the past five years. In contrast, exception and arbitration
scores only began to surge during the past decade. The data thus suggests that,
both in their first inception and their proliferation, protective obligations tend to
predate exceptions and arbitration control mechanisms.
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Note: The figure displays protection, exception, and arbitration scores of IlAs concluded between 1968
and 2013. For each year, the average of scores of treaties concluded that year is taken for the three
categories. The yearly results are then indexed between 0 and I as shares of 2013 values.
An important difference, however, lies in the timing of the first appearance
of treaty features and their diffusion. The features first introduced in Period 3
spread only marginally in the IIA universe in the 1990s and early 2000s. Only
after Period 4 innovations had already occurred, did the features of these two
periods of innovation diffuse more broadly in the HA universe. By 2013, on
average, every second treaty signed contained Period 3 features and every third
treaty had Period 4 elements. Accounting for this gap between treaty innovation
and diffusion is thus likely to be key in isolating and understanding the impact
of investment arbitration.
C. Developments in Investment Arbitration
Shifting from the effects we want to explain, i.e. treaty design changes, to
their potential causes, Figure 4 traces the evolution of the three investment
arbitration impact channels identified above: (1) the inclusion of investment
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Figure 4: Evolution of the three investment arbitration impact channels (Index
Basis: 2013 values)
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Note: The figure displays the development of the three ISA impact channels between 1959 and 2013.
The existence of ISA clauses is represented as the share of IlAs concluded per year that contain consent
to ISA, normalized by 2013 values. (All treaties concluded that year in our database contain consent to
ISA). Investment claims are measured as number of claims filed per year and normalized by 2013
values; fifty-one claims were submitted in 2013. Finally, investment awards data comes from italaw.com
and includes all awards and decisions of treaty-based investment tribunals rendered per year, normalized
by 2013 values. Eighty-one awards and decisions were rendered in 2013.
We see a steady increase in all three variables over time. First, investor-
state arbitration clauses began to appear in the IIA universe shortly after the
conclusion of the ICSID Convention and became virtually ubiquitous in the
1990s, with a small dip in recent years as countries like Australia stopped
including them in their treaties. 74 Second, investment claims began to increase
sharply in the late 1990s and have continued to increase, with more than fifty
claims being filed in 2013. Third, with a three- to five-year delay from the
commencement of arbitration claims, we also observe a steady growth in
investment case law from 2000 onward.
The remainder of this Article will bring together the different pieces of data
linking developments in investment arbitration to changes in treaty design. A
cursory comparison of the figures presented in this Part already suggests that the
interplay between investment arbitration and investment treaty design is a
complex one. Few if any significant treaty design changes seem to coincide in
time with major changes in investment arbitration. Numerous treaty design
innovations, like those in the early 1990s, either post-date (compared to
investment clauses) or predate (compared to the surge of investment claims)
74. For a discussion of the Australian policy change, see infra, Part IV.
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developments in investment arbitration, and stark changes in treaty design seem
to have occurred well after the first proliferation of investment disputes and
awards. Hence, we must engage in a nuanced investigation that distinguishes
between treaty design changes that can be attributed convincingly to investment
arbitration clauses, claims or cases and those that may be due to other factors.
IV. THE IMPACT OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES ON RULEMAKING
The first impact channel we identified was investment clauses. How does
the inclusion or omission of an ISA clause affect treaty design? Do states, for
instance, lower the degree of investment protection offered by their treaties or
include specific procedural safeguards when they choose to let an IIA be
enforced through investor-state arbitration? As this Part will show, investment
clauses do not have a material impact on the other treaty design elements we
coded for. This non-finding, however, has important normative implications.
A. No Material Impact on Treaty Design
In Part I, we hypothesized that treaties with ISA would display certain
procedural ex ante and ex post controls over the arbitration process and would
possess fewer investment protection features than treaties without it.
Surprisingly, however, we find that ISA's inclusion has not been accompanied
by a meaningful increase in other systematic treaty design changes.
1. ISA Clauses and Procedural Safeguards
On the procedural side, contrary to the expectation derived from the WTO
experience that more law (e.g. stronger enforcement) requires more politics (e.g.
extra-judicial flexibility), states did not accompany ISA clauses with control
mechanisms when they first decided to let investors enforce their IIAs.75 Prior to
1990, almost none of the BITs with ISA included additional procedural
safeguards. At most, agreements contained one out of the sixteen ex ante and ex
post arbitration controls for which we coded. These treaties may, for instance,
establish committees of state representatives charged with monitoring the
agreement's application. 6
In other words, in most of the early BITs with ISA signed prior to 1990, no
inter-state interaction is foreseen short of formal state-to-state dispute settlement.
Accordingly, the home state is excluded from taking any part in the ISA process.
The ISA procedure itself is sketched out in little detail, leaving it not to the
contracting parties but to the disputing parties, or-if they cannot agree-to the
arbitrators to mold the proceedings. 77 With little procedural guidance ex ante and
75. At the same time, not all of these early BITs contained comprehensive ISA clauses. For the
typology and prevalence of different ISA clauses, see Yackee, supra note 17.
76. See, e.g., Agreement on Economic Cooperation Between the Government of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, Neth.-Sing., art. XIII, May 16, 1972,
919 U.N.T.S. 87.
77. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of Nepal
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Ger.-Nepal, art. 10(2), Oct. 20,
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no means of intervening in the ISA dispute settlement process ex post, the
contracting states did not accompany the inclusion of ISA clauses in early BITs
with a set of procedural control mechanisms.
2. ISA Clauses and Substantive Treaty Design Differences
While ISA clauses were not accompanied by more widespread procedural
changes in treaty design, did they trigger changes in the substantive content of
IIAs: for example, prompting a reduction in protective clauses or an increase in
exception provisions? A comparison of the protection and exception dimensions
in IIAs with and without ISA suggests that ISA clauses do not lead to material
differences in substantive treaty content.
Figure 5 compares the summary statistics of IIAs with and without ISA as
boxplots. We see that both types of agreements display similar exception and
protection scores. The majority of treaties in either category have only zero to
two exceptions. When it comes to protection features, most treaties without ISA
range between five and seven clauses, while IIAs with ISA range between six
and eight protection clauses. Hence, apart from a slight difference in protection
features, treaties with and without ISA are strikingly similar.



















Protection w/o ISA Protection w/ ISA Exception w/o ISA Exception w/ ISA
Note: The figure compares FlAs with and without ISA between 1959 and 2013 as boxplots. The central
box marks the 50% of observations around the median (black line). The median is six and seven for
protection clauses without and with ISA respectively and one for exceptions in both groups. The
"whiskers" show upper and lower quartiles representing the range of observations with dots being
outliers.
In spite of this general similarity, did ISA clauses perhaps trigger treaty
design changes when they were first introduced? To answer that question we
1986, 1554 U.N.T.S. 306. Article 10(2) merely refers disputes to ICSID arbitration without specifying the
arbitration procedure or reserving a right for non-disputing parties to take part or to intervene.
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focus on the initial twenty years of the IIA universe between 1959 and 1979,
which marked the gradual transition from BITs without ISA to BITs with ISA.
We run a Poisson regression with the existence of an ISA clause as an
independent variable and the coded treaty scores of protection and exception
levels as dependent variables respectively. We control for differences stemming
from the richer treaty partner, as prior research found that developed countries
differ in the treaty templates they employ and that these templates have a strong
impact on treaty design outcomes. 78 The results are reported in summary form in
Table 2.7
Table 2: Results of a Poisson regression ofBITs between 1959 and 1979
investigating the link between the inclusion ofISA clauses and substantive treaty
design
Dependent variables:
Controls' Protection Scores Exception Scores
(1) (2)


















78. Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 5.
79. I am grateful to Dmitriy Skougarevskiy for his guidance on this regression design.








'Richer signatory country dummies (ISO-3 country code)
The regression results show a statistically significant positive effect of ISA
clauses on protection clauses, albeit with a very small magnitude. About every
sixth BIT with an ISA clause will have one protective clause more than a BIT
without an ISA clause. ISA clauses do not, however, have any statistically
significant effect on a BIT's propensity to include exception clauses. Therefore,
contrary to our expectation, the inclusion of ISA clauses did not lead to a material
redesigning of HAs. On the one hand, it increased rather than decreased the
protective dimension of a treaty-albeit only very slightly. On the other hand,
states did not increase exceptions in their BITs to mitigate the impact of ISA
clauses on policy issues. This absence of a larger effect of ISA clauses on the
substantive scope of BITs suggests that, when they first introduced ISA clauses,
states did not consider them to warrant a transformation of treaty design more
generally. They merely saw ISA clauses as self-standing procedural add-ons.
When we look at more modem IIAs with and without ISA this assessment
does not change. In April 2011, the Australian government announced that it
would refrain from including ISA clauses in future IlAs.so Comparing the
substantive protection and exception dimension of the treaties signed
immediately prior to this shift in policy (e.g. Australia-Chile FTA (2008) and
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (2009)) with those treaties signed after it
with New Zealand (2011), Malaysia (2012) and Japan (2014), we do not find any
systematic variation in treaty design between ISA and non-ISA treaties. Eleven
out of the fifteen protection clauses and sixteen out of the twenty-three exception
clauses do not vary across the five agreements. More importantly, of the
remaining eleven features that do vary, not one of them clusters in groups of ISA
versus non-ISA treaties. Hence, Australia considered ISA clauses as something
it could include or omit in its treaties without having to adjust the agreements'
substantive scope.
Finally, recent investment treaty practice provides an even more striking
illustration of the non-impact of ISA clauses on other substantive treaty design
elements. The TPP concluded in October 2015 contains an investment chapter
80. See Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading Our Way to More Jobs and
Prosperity, AUSTL. Gov'T, DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE 14 (Apr. 2011), http://blogs.usyd
.edu.au/japaneselaw/201 IGillard%20Govt/o20Trade%2OPolicy/o2OStatement.pdf.
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with an ISA mechanism.8 ' Australia and New Zealand, however, agreed in a
letter exchange to preclude its investors from having recourse to ISA against the
other party respectively.82 That means that identical TPP investment obligations
and exceptions are enforceable by investors and their home states in some
bilateral relationships and exclusively by the home states in others. The choice
of enforcement mechanism is thus independent from the substantive content of
an IIA.
B. Implications for Normative Debates
The empirical analysis revealed that the introduction of ISA clauses has not
been accompanied by material treaty design alterations. From this analysis, we
can draw two key lessons.
1. Procedural Controls and the Depoliticization ofInvestment
Disputes
Considered in light of the historical context, the decision not to add further
procedural safeguards when ISA clauses were first introduced seems to have
been a conscious design choice rather than an oversight by the treaty drafters.
Depoliticizing investment disputes and pacifying international relations was a
major impetus for the development of investor-state arbitration in the 1960s; it
was thought that enabling private investors to sue host states would prevent
investment disputes from becoming inter-state disputes.83 Accordingly, BITs
with ISA involved a basic bargain for both home and host states: home states
would refrain from vindicating the rights of their nationals abroad as long as host
states agreed to settle disputes with these foreign investors via international
arbitration.84 The exclusion of inter-state or home state control mechanisms over
investor-state arbitration was thus an intentional design feature to depoliticize
investment disputes.85
Whether the same rationale of depoliticization still justifies the exclusion
of procedural state controls today, however, is doubtful. The risk of investment
disputes spiraling into inter-state conflict is lower today than it was at the advent
81. For an in-depth discussion, see Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 35.
82. Letter from Andrew Robb, Minister for Trade and Investment, Australia to Todd McClay,
Minister of Trade, New Zealand (Feb. 4, 2016), dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/official-
documents/Documents/australia-new-zealand-investor-state-dispute-settlement-trade-remedies-and-
transport-services.pdf; Letter from Todd McClay, Minister of Trade, New Zealand to Andrew Robb,
Minister for Trade and Investment, Australia (Feb. 4, 2016), dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/official-
documents/Documents/australia-new-zealand-investor-state-dispute-settlement-trade-remedies-and-
transport-services.pdf.
83. BROCHES, supra note 13, at 163; Shihata, supra note 13, at 2. See generally PARRA, supra
note 13. In addition, the ICSID Convention provided in Article 27 that home states are precluded from
exercising diplomatic protection vis-d-vis investors while an investor-state arbitration is ongoing. ICSID
Convention, supra note 14, art. 27.
84. Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 402-04.
85. As Figure 3 reveals, starting in the 1990s and gaining traction in the 2000s, we see a partial
reversal of that policy and a "return of the state" as more procedural ex ante and ex post controls are
inserted into IIAs to accompany ISA clauses. See Alschner, supra note 36; Alvarez, supra note 2. We will
further discuss this policy change in the next Part as it coincided with the spread of investment claims
rather than investment clauses.
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of ICSID. Ideological divides have given way to embedded liberalism;
international organizations ensure constant inter-state dialogue and provide
mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.86 Indeed, empirical research
shows that high-level political pressure over investment issues has become
extremely rare.87 At the same time, investor-state dispute settlement today is a
driver of politicization rather than a vehicle of depoliticization given the
controversies surrounding it." It now divides states into ISA supporters (e.g.
United States), opponents (e.g. Venezuela) and reformers (e.g. European Union).
As a result, justifications prominent in the 1960s should not stand in the way of
a more important role of procedural safeguards today. Recalling the mutually
beneficial interaction of law and politics at the WTO discussed above, the
infusion of more inter-state politics into investment law may be the best recipe
to attenuate the increasingly controversial perception of ISA. Recent treaty
practice suggests that such developments are well underway. 89
2. Substantive Investor Rights? ISA Clauses as Mere Procedural
Add-ons
Turning to the substantive treaty dimension, the empirical analysis revealed
that ISA clauses are procedural add-ons whose inclusion or omission does not
materially alter the substantive content of an IIA. Apart from a slight propensity
to be more protective, HAs do not systematically vary depending on whether they
contain ISA or not. This finding should thus add a qualification to assertions that
ISA clauses are to be viewed as transformative of HAs. While the inclusion of
ISA clauses in HAs has undoubtedly impacted the practice of investment law,
their inclusion or omission had a much weaker effect on treaty design.
Negotiators do not design their agreements differently depending on whether
they draft an IIA with or without ISA.
This insight has important normative implications. First, it helps us
reevaluate claims that ISA changed the "nature" of investment treaties. The
nature of HAs, and the nature of their substantive obligations in particular, are a
hotly debated issue in international investment law. One camp posits that the
substantive obligations contained in IAs are only owed towards the other state
party and that investor rights are procedural, but not substantive, in nature. 90
Another camp asserts that the protective obligations in HAs are owed to the other
86. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs, 11
INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 159 (1993); see also John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379 (1982).
87. Geoffrey Gertz, Srividya Jandhyala & Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, Legalization and
Diplomacy: American Power and the Investment Regime, Working Paper.
88. On ISA controversies, see supra notes 21 and 22.
89. See, e.g., Alschner, supra note 36; Roberts, supra note 56; UNCTAD, supra note 53.
90. Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. The
United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/5, Award, 1 173 (Nov. 21, 2007); ZACHARY
DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 35 (2009) (Substantive obligations are
merely "applicable adjudicative standards for the claimant's cause of action rather than binding
obligations owed directly to the investor.").
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contracting states and their investors directly." Some go even further, arguing
that IIAs are like "contracts for the benefit of third parties" and are to be enforced
primarily by investors and only secondarily by states. 92 Deciding which camp is
right has significant implications for a myriad of practical legal questions on how
inter-state affairs affect investor-state relations and vice versa. If substantive
investment treaty rights are owed to states alone, a host state can, for instance,
rightfully suspend them as countermeasures without paying compensation in
response to a lawful act by the home state. By contrast, if treaty rights are owed
to the investor, such an international-law-compliant retaliation does not absolve
the host from the obligation to pay compensation to the home state's investors
aggrieved thereby.93 Similarly, if substantive treaty rights are vested in states,
home governments can settle investment disputes over the heads of their
investors; yet if these rights actually belong to individuals, investors could veto
any such settlements or re-litigate disputes already settled between the
contracting parties. 94 Finally, substantive investor rights would also mean that
investors could waive treaty protection in investment contracts; if, however, the
rights were those of the home state, then it would not be in the investor's power
to forego them.95 Our analysis sheds new light on these and related legal debates
by revealing that ISA's impact is purely procedural: through an ISA clause a
second enforcement route is added next to the state-to-state dispute settlement
procedure; no material and systematic impact on investment treaty substance was
detected. This empirical insight thus suggests that the more convincing view is
that ISA clauses create procedural, but not substantive, investor rights. 96
Second, the independence of enforcement and substance may also affect
how an investment treaty is to be interpreted. The existence of investor-state
arbitration has given rise to an individualized conception of key protective
provisions. Tribunals assess compliance with fair and equitable treatment based
on whether the investor's individual legitimate expectations, rather than those of
its home state, were violated.97 Similarly, when determining whether a more
favorable clause from a third treaty should be incorporated by reference into the
91. Corn Products International, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility, 1 174 (Jan. 15, 2008); see also Tillmann Rudolf Braun,
Globalization-driven Innovation: The Investor as a Partial Subject in Public International Law - An
Inquiry into the Nature and Limits ofInvestor Rights 37 (The Jean Monnet Ctr. for Int'l and Regional
Econ. L. & Just., Working Paper No. 04/13, 2013), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=2286607.
92. See Ecuador v. United States Expert Opinion, supra note 24, 13.
93. Martins Paparinskis, Equivalent Primary Rules and Diferential Secondary Rules:
Countermeasures in WTO and Investment Protection Law, in MULTI-SOURCED EQUIVALENT NORMS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 259 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2011).
94. Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of
Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 31 (2014).
95. DOUGLAS, supra note 90, at 10-38; Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BR. YEARB. INT'L L. 151, 169-70 (2004).
96. While this does not disprove the point that the inclusion of ISA may have implicitly affected
the nature of HAs' substantive obligations, it places a higher burden of persuasion on proponents of the
substantive investor rights view to show why the original inter-state nature of 11A obligations has been
altered even though no explicit change in substantive treaty content is empirically apparent.
97. Michele Potesta, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the
Roots and the Limits ofa Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID REV. 88 (2013).
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base treaty through M!FN, more favorable treatment is measured vis-A-vis the
particular claiming investor and not in relation to an abstract class of home state
investors or vis-A-vis the home state itself.98 Finally, with respect to national
treatment, tribunals and scholars have argued for differing interpretations
between trade and investment regimes on the basis that the former is about
competitive opportunities between states, while the latter is about protecting
individual rights.99 The interpretation of IIA provisions, which are typically
phrased as inter-state promises, in such an individualized light draws its
justification from ISA's enforcement procedure. The conceptual separation of
procedure and substance in IIAs may thus prompt us to reconsider the merits of
a more state-centric rather than investor-centric interpretation of IAs' protection
clauses.
Finally, the insight that ISA clauses are procedural add-ons that leave
substantive IIA obligations unaffected gives flexibility to investment treaty
drafters to tweak the system's enforcement architecture. Whether negotiators
want to reform ISA, replace it with an investment court system as suggested by
the EU, or omit it entirely, opting for a WTO-like state-to-state dispute settlement
system instead, they can do so independently of any concurrent reform of the
treaties' substance. Similarly, the independence of substance and procedure also
means that multilateralization efforts can selectively target only the latter.
Negotiators can thus replace agreement-specific ad hoc tribunals with a standing
multilateral body while leaving bilateral treaties dealing with substantive
investment protection in place. In short, the insight that ISA is a mere procedural
add-on helps negotiators to reform investment law.
V. THE IMPACT OF ARBITRATION CLAIMS ON RULEMAKING
The puzzle remains why states did not react to the inclusion of ISA clauses
by changing the design of IIAs, given ISA's potentially more severe impact on
sovereignty as compared to inter-state arbitration. Did they specifically intend to
leave treaty design otherwise unchanged? Or did they perhaps misunderstand the
true potential of ISA enforcement and were surprised when, thirty years after
ISA's first inclusion, investment claims suddenly began to proliferate? When
states then learned about the implications of ISA, did they respond by lowering
investment protection and by adding defensive elements to their treaties to
mitigate the adverse impact of ISA on their policy space? To find answers to
these questions we turn to the second impact channel-the effect of investment
claims on treaty design.
A. Learning From Claims?
To measure the impact of investment claims, we first have to understand
the causal mechanisms by which they affect treaty design. Scholars investigating
98. Tony Cole, The Boundaries of Most Favoured Nation Treatment in International
Investment Law, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 537, 571-72 (2012).
99. Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment
Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 48 (2008).
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the effect of investment claims typically start from the premise that states may
have underestimated or misunderstood the full potential of ISA.io From that
premise onwards, however, opinions diverge on how best to explain the way
states learn from investment claims and alter their treaty design. One theory
posits that states may be Bayesian learners, updating their treaty design
preferences when new information becomes available.o'0 Under a second theory,
states are assumed not to act perfect-rationally, but bounded-rationally, only
changing their treaties when they themselves become subject to an investment
claim and immediately feel its adverse impact.1 02 As we will show, regardless of
which theory is investigated, scholars need to account for bidirectional causal
effects and unobserved intervening or supervening variables; moreover, they
need to clearly distinguish between what treaty design change is measured-
innovation or diffusion-to unveil the causal mechanisms connecting claims and
treaty design.
1. Bayesian Learners
If states were Bayesian learners, then the first information that they could
have used to update their knowledge about ISA's true implications would have
been the first treaty-based investment claim, AAPL, which was admitted in a
1990 decision. 0 3 As discussed above, AAPL was the first tribunal to recognize
the initially controversial position that an ISA clause in an IIA provides the
investor with a direct means of recourse to enforce treaty violations before
international arbitration. We would then expect to observe treaty design changes
being introduced widely in the early 1990s in the wake of that decision.
2. Bounded Rational Learners
The alternative theory posits that states only reacted to investment claims
when they felt the detrimental consequences of ISA themselves and not by
learning about claims against others. Investigating the impact of investment
claims on treaty signing patterns, Poulsen and Aisbett, for instance, find that
developing countries tended to sign fewer investment treaties only when they
100. SeesupraPartl.
101. A Bayesian learner theory, supposing that states learn generally from investment disputes
around the world, arguably underlies most legal scholarship on the subject. See, e.g., UNCTAD, supra
note 3, at 71 ("It is evident that the significant increase in the number of ISDS claims over the last decade
has had an impact on the process of investment rulemaking. ISDS practice has led numerous countries to
realize that the specific wording oflIA provisions does matter, and that it can make a significant difference
to the outcome of an investment dispute. Thus, it is no coincidence that several countries in the Asia-
Pacific region recently revised their model HAs and updated their wording, content, and structure to
incorporate the lessons learned from investment-related litigation experience.").
102. Lauge N. Skougaard Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning, 65 WORLD POL. 273 (2013); Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen,
Sacrificing Sovereignty by Chance: Investment Treaties, Developing Countries, and Bounded Rationality
(June 2011) (unpublished Ph.D Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science),
http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/141/1/PoulsenSacrificing-sovereignty-by-chance.pdf; sources cited supra note
45.
103. AAPL Award, supra note 43.
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were hit by investment claims themselves rather than in response to investment
claims generally. "
The underlying idea derived from behavioral sciences is that decision
makers tend to "rely excessively on information that is vivid and easily
available."105 Information about claims against other states is both emotionally
remote due to optimism bias ("this will never happen to us") as well as costly to
obtain. In contrast, being hit by a claim is an immediate and vivid experience.
This then results in a bias in information processing as states fail to react to
readily available information until they themselves become a target for
investment claims.
Which theory better corresponds to reality is a matter of empirical analysis.
Yet, in order to empirically verify one theory or the other, researchers have to
isolate the causal impact of investment claims from other factors that may
influence investment treaty design.
3. Limitations ofExisting Econometric Evidence and the Need for
Context
Econometric studies are used in deductive empirics to find causal
relationships. In the context of investment claims' impact on treaty design, these
studies have yielded mixed results. Manger and Peinhardt found that learning
from both claims against others (Bayesian updating) as well as claims against the
home state (bounded rationality) lead to treaty design change.106 They conclude
that states add "precision" to their treaties, modeled alternatively as an aggregate
count of coded clauses or treaty length, in response to investment claims.
Opting for a different research design, Dmitriy Skougarevskiy and I
concluded that being hit by a claim does not cause treaty design innovation.107
We focus on textual innovation rather than changes in coded clauses or treaty
length and account for a potential endogeneity of claims and treaty design by
including an instrumental variable. Even if we allow for a lagged impact, we do
not find any statistically significant effect of investment claims on treaty design
innovation. We did not test the Bayesian updating theory.
In order to properly understand the impact of investment claims, we need
to move beyond existing studies. First, as we saw in Part III, there is a gap
between treaty innovation in the early 1990s and 2000s and their diffusion
starting in the second half of the 2000s. Earlier work focuses either on innovation
or diffusion, yet only if we investigate both dimensions and understand the gap
between them, can we accurately describe the impact of investment claims.
Second, econometric studies investigating the impact of investment claims
struggle with omitted variable bias, making alternative, more contextual,
104. Poulsen & Aisbett, supra note 102.
105. Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and the Difusion ofModern Investment Treaties, supra note
45, at 5.
106. Manger & Peinhardt, supra note 3, at 18.
107. Wolfgang Alschner & Drnitriy Skougarevskiy, Consistency and Legal Innovation in the
BIT Universe (Stanf. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2595288, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2595288.
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research strategies more viable. On the one hand, we need contextual knowledge
to understand whether bidirectional causation is at work: investment claims may
lead to treaty design variations, but vice versa, treaty design variations may also
lead to investment claims. On the other hand, contextual knowledge is also
required to identify alternative causal factors diluting, enhancing, or impeding
any impact of investment claims on treaty design. In particular, we need to
investigate whether, how, and why responses to investment claims may vary
across countries. Although sophisticated econometric studies employing
instrumental variables, better control variables, and/or fixed effects may be able
to overcome these difficulties, a precondition to any such exercise is a thorough
contextual understanding of the interaction between different variables. In the
remainder of this Part we therefore provide such a contextual account using case
studies, and distinguish between innovation and diffusion as variables to be
explained.
B. Treaty Design Innovation and Investment Claims
We begin by analyzing the causal impact of claims on treaty design
innovation looking at the two periods of innovation that coincide with the surge
of investment claims-Period 3 innovations from the early 1990s and Period 4
innovations from the early 2000s.
1. Innovation in the Early 1990s: Anticipating Rather than
Reacting to Investment Claims
What caused the inclusion of new treaty design features in the early 1990s?
Almost all the elements we coded for (apart from GATT XX type exceptions)
that were introduced in this period can be linked to one agreement: the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In NAFTA, Canada, Mexico, and
the United States radically expanded the then-existing treaty design, adding
sixteen new features (out of the fifty-five coded) to the repertoire of IIAs. What
motivated Canada, Mexico, and the United States to introduce a radically
different treaty design consisting of new exceptions and novel control
mechanisms in arbitration?
When NAFTA was concluded in 1992, none of the NAFTA parties had
been subject to investment claims. Hence, bounded rationality fails to explain the
shift in policy. Were Canada, Mexico, and the United States then perhaps
negotiating under the shadow of the AAPL claim accepted previously in 1990 as
Bayesian learners? Probably not. First, although AAPL has in hindsight been
labeled a landmark event, it was much less well known at the time it was decided,
even in academic circles. Io Strikingly, although the 1992 American Society of
International Law Annual Meeting (coinciding with NAFTA negotiations)
covered the issue of investment law and even invited ajudge from Sri Lanka (the
country targeted by the first investment claim), none of the speakers even
108. Appropriately, Pauwelyn calls it a "silent revolution." Pauwelyn, supra note 25, at 397.
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mentioned the case.109 The claim was only popularized and placed in its wider
context through Jan Paulsson's seminal article "Arbitration without Privity" five
years later.I 0 Second, the AAPL decision was legally controversial at the time it
was rendered, producing a dissenting opinion.I" Hence, it was far from clear that
the position adopted by the tribunal's majority would be considered mainstream
by the end of the decade. Third, even if the NAFTA negotiators had known about
AAPL, a legally controversial majority opinion against a developing country on
the other side of the Pacific concerning a shrimp farm is unlikely to have
triggered a major policy review in the United States and Canada. Fourth, while
the United States agreed to significant treaty design innovations in NAFTA, it
did not subsequently alter its BIT model until a later 2004 reform.' 12 Had the
NAFTA policy change been prompted by a sudden realization of ISA's true
nature, these changes would then have arguably also been integrated into U.S.
BITs. The reason for the treaty design shift must thus be found in NAFTA itself
and not in AAPL.
NAFTA marked the first time in modem investment law that two
developed countries with large mutual foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks
agreed between themselves on extensive investment protection provisions
enforced through investor-state arbitration." 3 Including an investment chapter in
an FTA was not strictly new. The Canada-USA Free Trade Agreement signed in
1988 already had an investment chapter, albeit without investor-state
arbitration. " 4 Thus, the novelty in NAFTA was the integration of an ISA clause,
which, even though it was presumably targeted primarily at the newcomer
Mexico, could also be used against Canada or the United States.
Most investment relations underlying IIAs were marked by decidedly
asymmetric capital flows from a (developed) source to a (developing) destination
country."s In contrast, investment relations in NAFTA were characterized by
109. Asoka de Z. Gunawardana & Jos6 E. Alvarez, The Inception and Growth of Bilateral
Investment Promotion and Protection Treaties, PROC. ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC.'Y INT'L L.) 544 (1992).
110. Paulsson, supra note 47.
111. Asian Agric. Prod. Ltd. v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Dissenting Opinion of Samuel K.B. Asante (June 15, 1990) 4 ICSID Rep. 246 (1997).
112. See Section V.C.2 for United States case study.
113. See Mark Clodfelter, U.S. State Department Participation in International Economic
Dispute Resolution, 42 S. TEx. L. REv. 1273, 1283 (2001) ("The United States, and for that matter Canada
and Mexico, took a very big step into the unknown when they signed on to Chapter I. .. . Even though
the United States has been party to a fair number of BITs, which have arrangements resembling Chapter
11, we have never done so with states that have so much investment in our territory."); Daniel M. Price,
An Overview ofthe NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement,
27 INT'L L. 727, 736 (1993); J. Anthony VanDuzer, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under NAFTA
Chapter 11: The Shape of Things to Come, 35 CAN: Y.B. INT'L L. 263, 266 (1997). Canada and the U.S.
had already concluded an FTA with an investment chapter in 1988. However, that earlier agreement only
contained a rudimentary set of provisions and no ISA. See Jean Raby, The Investment Provisions of the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 394, 395
(1990) ("Canada is the big winner on investment ... Canada's ability to regulate and control American
direct investment has not been drastically reduced by the FTA.").
114. See Raby, supra note 113, at 418.
115. See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work: An Evaluation of
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67, 77 (2005) ("[A] BIT
between a developed and a developing country is founded on a grand bargain: a promise of protection of
capital in return for the prospect of more capital in the future."); see also Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by
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considerable bidirectional investment flows and mutual FDI stock.1 6 This novel
symmetry in investment relations had an impact on treaty design. Negotiators
could no longer ignore the possibility that Canada or the United States would
become targets for investment claims. Then, an exception structure and
enforcement architecture emerged that mitigated the impact of investment
arbitration claims. The NAFTA treaty design revolution was thus about
anticipating rather than reacting to investment claims.
If that assessment of the policy shift underlying NAFTA is correct, then an
important corollary follows. While empirical research shows that developing
countries may have long underestimated the liability risks of ISA enforcement,'"
at least some developed states were arguably aware of them. However, until
NAFTA these states considered the likelihood of ISA enforcement too remote.
Empirical research suggests that developed countries are chiefly responsible for
treaty design outcomes by furnishing and insisting on their treaty template as
basis for negotiations." 8 Put differently, developed countries are the system's
rule-makers while developing countries are its rule-takers. As long as investment
flows were asymmetrical, the likelihood for a developed state to be sued by a
developing country investor was extremely remote."'9 Hence, developed
countries could comfortably live with a strong ISA enforcement without
simultaneously lowering protection or adding voice to the arbitration procedure
because they were not likely to be the target of the more intrusive law
enforcement.1 20 NAFTA changed this arrangement. As symmetry entered
investment relations so did the safeguards to mitigate the anticipated effect of
investment arbitration through additional exceptions and arbitration control
mechanisms that we identified in Table 1. Hence, while the Mexico, United
States and Canada may not have fully foreseen all implications of ISA, they, in
contrast to (most) developing countries, did not need to learn from investment
claims, but had already understood the broad liability implications of ISA.
BIT: The Growth ofBilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing
Countries, 24 INT'L L. 655, 663 (1990) ("[A]n asymmetry exists between the parties to most BITs since
one state will be the source and the other the recipient of virtually any investment flows between the two
countries.").
116. ALAN M. RUGMAN, MULTINATIONALS AND CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE 12
(1990).
117. See POULSEN, supra note 45.
118. See Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 5.
119. See PATRICK JUILLARD, L'tVOLUTION DES SOURCES DU DROIT DES INVESTISSEMENTS 108
(1994); F. A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection ofInvestments, 52 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L
L. 241 (1982).
120. In that vein, former U.S. BIT negotiator Alvarez explains: "The United States did not need
to worry very much about adapting its laws or practices,. .. because, given the one-way flow of capital
between the relevant parties, it was extremely unlikely that investors from any of those countries would
emerge in any significant presence in the United States, much less be in a position to file a complaint
against the United States for a breach of the BIT." Jos6 E. Alvarez, The Evolving BIT, 7 TRANSNAT'L
DISP. MGMT. 3 (2010), www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key-1542.
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2. Innovation in the Early 2000s: Refinements Based on Case Law
Developments Rather Than Learning From Claims
While NAFTA innovations may not have been caused by then-existing
investment claims, can the Period 4 innovations from the early 2000s be
explained as reactions to investment claims? Poulsen highlights that "it wasn't
until around 2002 that developing countries had clear information available that
BITs' ability to expose host states to liabilities was very real and concrete, rather
than merely vague and abstract." 21 Also, by that time, developed countries had
become the targets of investment claims. The late 1990s had seen a wave of
NAFTA claims launched against the United States and Canada, and the first set
of awards, such as Mondev v. United States and S.D. Myers v. Canada, was
handed down in 2002.122 In short, while states may not have taken notice of the
AAPL claim, they could be expected to react to the wave of claims that had
materialized by the early 2000s as Bayesian learners. Alternatively, they might
have become targets of investment claims themselves, potentially triggering a
bounded rational response. Although the timing of Period 4 innovations
coinciding with the rise of claims could suggest as much, the substance of the
innovations paints a different picture.
If states had been surprised by an unexpected surge of investment claims
and sought to correct their earlier mistakes by reining in the treaties' propensity
to unduly restrict policy space, we would expect states to react with Period 3
features as we have seen them in the early 1990s: new exceptions, means of inter-
state intervention into the arbitral process, and limitations on the access and
compensation arbitration can provide to investors. These changes gave birth to a
veritably new type of investment treaty design and arbitration.
Period 4 innovations, in contrast, constitute targeted refinements. Some of
these refinements, such as new provisions on preliminary objections, also make
it easier for states to defend against investment claims. Yet, the bulk of
innovation is not targeted at correcting the architecture of investment treaties as
such, but is rather aimed at guiding its use and preventing its abuse. As we will
show in Part VI, these novel inclusions (such as a clarification that MFN does
not apply to dispute settlement clauses) would hardly make sense as tools to limit
the impact of investment claims devoid of the context supplied by arbitral
practice and jurisprudence. Part VI, infra, argues that these innovations are to be
understood not as reactions to unanticipated investment claims, but to
unanticipated investment case law.
C. Treaty Design Diffusion and Investment Claims
While investment claims cannot convincingly be said to have caused most
of the treaty innovation from the 1990s onwards, did they play a significant role
in their diffusion? As this Section will show, the impact of investment claims on
121. POULSEN, supra note 102, at 203-04.
122. Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSTD Case No. ARB(AF)/ 99/2,
Award (Oct. I1, 2002) [hereinafter Mondev Award]; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, Second
Partial Award (Oct. 21, 2002) [hereinafter S.D. Myers Second Partial Award].
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the diffusion of treaty design changes is actually much smaller than the vivid,
well-known example of the United States changing its BIT design in the wake of
claims suggests. Two other processes have instead decisively shaped the
diffusion of treaty design change: (1) bidirectional causation and (2) the domestic
policy environment, which determines whether path dependency and
bureaucratic inertia are heeded or overcome.
1. Bidirectional Causation
In part, econometric models face difficulty in isolating the impact of
investment claims on treaty design because causality can work both ways, a
phenomenon also known as reverse or bidirectional causality: investment claims
can cause treaty design changes, and treaty design changes can cause investment
claims.
NAFTA is a case in point. Quite counter-intuitively, NAFTA-a treaty
designed to fend off investment claims through more exceptions and procedural
controls-has been instrumental in facilitating the surge of investment claims. In
the decade between AAPL in 1987 and 1997, only eleven investment cases were
filed. 123 All but two of them were brought under different BITs, involved
different parties, and were defended and heard by different counsels and
arbitrators. Moreover, half of these early cases were settled without resulting in
awards. Put differently, by 1997, investment arbitration hardly existed as a field.
Then, between 1997 and 1999, a total of thirty-one claims were submitted, ten of
which were brought under NAFTA.
NAFTA by itself did not cause these claims. Yet, it provided a necessary,
if not sufficient, environment to enable their proliferation. First of all, in the late
1990s a group of inventive and entrepreneurial North American lawyers
"discovered" NAFTA's potential for opening a new avenue of litigation. One of
these NAFTA pioneers was Canadian lawyer Barry Appleton. In June 1994,
Appleton published "Navigating NAFTA: A Concise User's Guide to the North
American Free Trade Agreement."l 24 In 1997, he filed one of the first NAFTA
cases: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada. In the following three consecutive years,
Appleton represented claimants in S.D. Myers (1998), Pope & Talbot (1999) and
UPS (2000) against Canada. 125 NAFTA thus enabled industrious lawyers like
Barry Appleton to establish a new area of litigation practice.
Second, the development of Chapter 11 into an area of litigation triggered
a migration of prestigious practitioners attracted by new professional
opportunities, as well as a need for competent NAFTA arbitrators. High-level
adjudicators from other international tribunals, including Stephen Schwebel,
former judge and president of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), joined the
123. This number is based on UNCTAD's database on investor-state disputes, Investment
Dispute Settlement Navigator, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (last visited Aug.
15, 2016).
124. BARRY APPLETON, NAVIGATING NAFTA: A CONCISE USER'S GUIDE TO THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (1994).
125. See Experience, APPLETON & ASSOCIATES, http://www.appletonlaw.com/experience.html
(last visited Oct. 3, 2016).
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bourgeoning field.126 At the same time, former U.S. government lawyers shifted
from the public to the private sector to act as counsels in NAFTA investment
disputes.1 27 This migration into NAFTA investment arbitration practice not only
brought further expertise to the field but also bolstered its professional appeal to
aspiring young lawyers both in North America and abroad.
Third, the surge of NATTA Chapter 11 claims from the 1990s onwards was
also a key factor in establishing investment arbitration as a field of study. Early
NAFTA cases sparked vivid academic debates drawing scholars and their
students to this new field of law. A search for academic journal articles on
HeinOnline using "NAFTA Chapter 11" and "investment arbitration" as key
words between 1992 and 2012 illustrates this: NAFTA Chapter 11 initially
received more academic attention than investment arbitration, yet starting in the
mid-2000s investment arbitration eclipsed the former in academic
publications.1 28
Finally, NAFTA made investment arbitration known to the North
American general public. Inspired by controversies surrounding Chapter I1's
implications for environmental or health policy, non-governmental interest
groups took positions on (and often against) elements of Chapter 11 contributing
to public awareness on investment arbitration.1 29 Furthermore, media coverage
on investment arbitration increased as programs like the 2002 PBS documentary
"Trading Democracy" critically reviewed early NAFTA cases.' 30 At a time when
few non-experts knew about investment arbitration in Europe, the issue had
already triggered public debates in North America. In short, NAFTA was the
best promotion campaign investment arbitration could have gotten and was
therefore instrumental in setting the stage for the ensuing proliferation of
investment claims.
NAFTA's role in shaping the early days of investment arbitration had an
impact on the subsequent diffusion of its treaty design elements, which surged
from the mid-2000s onwards. Of the ten NAFTA claims submitted between 1997
126. Stephen Schwebel was ajudge at the ICJ between 1981 and 2000 and its president between
1997 and 2000. He was first appointed as NAFTA arbitrator by the respondent in Mondev Award, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2. He has since served on a number of investment arbitration tribunals. See Stephen
M. Schwebel, INT'L ARB. INST., http://www.iaiparis.com/profile/stephen.schwebel (last visited Oct. 13,
2016).
127. For example, Daniel Price negotiated NAFTA for the United States and afterwards joined
Sidley Austin LLP's to work as counsel on investment cases later leaving the firm to work independently
as arbitrator. See DANIEL M. PRICE PLLC, http://danielmpricepllc.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2016).
Similarly, Bart Legum, Chief of the NAFTA Arbitration Division at the U.S. State Department between
2000 and 2004, left the public sector to head Dentons' Investment Treaty Arbitration Practice. See Bart
Legum, DENTONS, http://www.dentons.com/en/barton-legum (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
128. In 1992, more articles were published on investment arbitration than on NAFTA Chapter
11. However, NAFTA scholarship overtook general investment arbitration writing in 1999; the volume of
NAFTA Chapter I1 scholarship peaked in 2005. After 2005, the trends reversed and by 2012, six times
as many articles were published on investment arbitration than on NAFTA Chapter 11. These figures were
retrieved based on a key word search for "investment arbitration" and "NAFTA Chapter II" on
HeinOnline in December 2015.
129. Meg Kinnear & Robin Hansen, The Influence ofNAFTA Chapter 11in the BIT Landscape,
12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 101, 106-09 (2005).
130. See Politics and Economy: Trading Democracy, PBS (Feb. 1, 2002), http//www.pbs.org
/now/politics/tradingdemocracy.html.
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and 1999, nine resulted in awards. NAFTA decisions were thus among the first
rendered by arbitral tribunals shaping the foundation of this early field of law.
The Metalclad,131 Loewenl32 or Methanex13 3 awards have become "classics" in
today's investment arbitration. Moreover, until 2013 NAFTA was the most
litigated treaty with over fifty disputes filed.' 34 As a result, NAFTA provisions
are among the most interpreted and commented treaty elements in the IIA
universe, adding to their predictability. It is thus easy to see why NAFTA
innovations spread as investment claims rose: if countries wanted to change their
treaty design to mitigate the often unforeseen impact of investment claims, they
could turn to NAFTA as an off-the-shelf alternative to their existing practice that
had been tried and tested in actual cases. The use of NAFTA in early claims thus
created a path dependency as countries opted into language tested and clarified
through arbitration.
In conclusion, we are confronted with a causality loop between investment
claims and the diffusion of NAFTA design elements: NAFTA provided an
enabling environment that led to investment claims, and these investment claims,
in turn, entrenched NAFTA's position as a trusted treaty design alternative for
countries anticipating or reacting to investment claims.
2. Stories ofNon-diffusion: United States, Canada, Germany and
Japan
Yet, what exactly triggers a country's decision to engage in innovation by
opting into the NAFTA treaty design elements? Is it, as the above-presented
theories suggest, a response to being hit by an investment claim or learning from
others' experiences with arbitration? Or are there other elements at play? To
answer that question, we investigated the changing BIT practice of the United
States, Canada, Germany and Japan.13 5 These four countries share similar
characteristics-they are wealthy, developed democracies with large stocks of
outward and inward investments. Yet, their experience with investment claims
and treaty design changes differs starkly, making them interesting case studies.
The United States and Canada were subject to investment claims early on, yet
while the United States changed the design of its treaties only after becoming a
respondent to investment claims, Canada had integrated many NAFTA features
into its BITs prior to its first investment claim. Germany was also hit by
investment claims early on, but did not alter its treaties subsequently. Finally,
131. Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶
73 (Aug. 30, 2000) [hereinafter Metalclad Award].
132. Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, ¶ 1 (Jun. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Loewen Award].
133. Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 8 (Aug. 7, 2002)
[hereinafter Methanex Partial Award]; Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final
Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, ¶ 2 (Aug. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Methanex Final Award].
134. After 2013, the Energy Charter Treaty overtook NAFTA, attracting double-digit numbers
of new cases per year. Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, supra note 44.
135. We focus exclusively on BITs (rather than ITAs generally) to ensure comparability between
the four different cases; Germany has not signed any FTAs with investment chapters on its own.
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although Japan was never a respondent in an investment dispute, it remodeled its
treaties significantly after 2002.
We purposefully focus on developed countries rather than developing
countries in these case studies. Although investment claims may also change the
policy preferences of developing countries, these changes are less likely to lead
to actual treaty design adjustments given the asymmetric rule-taker-versus-rule-
maker dynamics prevalent in the IIA universe.1 36 While developed countries
have the bargaining power to translate changes of their policy preferences into
changes in the design of the treaties they negotiate,137 developing countries are
less able to affect negotiation outcomes. Thus, developing countries are more
likely to respond to changing preferences through unilateral acts halting their
investment treaty programs (e.g., Argentina),138 denouncing selected BITs (e.g.,
South Africa or Indonesia), 139 or exiting the system altogether (e.g., Bolivia or
Ecuador).1 40
The review of these developed-country case studies will show that it takes
more than investment claims to diffuse treaty design elements. Day-to-day
investment policy comes from bureaucratic structures prone to inertia and a
status quo bias. 141 Policy makers can break with path dependency and engage in
innovation. However, whether or not they break with path dependency depends
on factors other than investment claims, including, but not limited to, the
streamlining of foreign investment policy, changing national or international
economic policy agendas, or changes in how information on investor-state
arbitration is disseminated and processed in a country.
a. United States - Treaty Design Change After
Investment Claims
The experience of the United States is the primary showcase for a strong
impact of investment arbitration on rulemaking. In 1999, soon after it faced its
first investment claim under NAFTA in Loewen,'42 the United States halted the
negotiation of new investment treaties and initiated a policy review. The outcome
136. See Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 5.
137. Some developing states, such as India, have also revised their model agreements in
anticipation of future investment treaty negotiations and renegotiations. At the time of this writing,
however, no investment treaty has been negotiated on that template. Developed countries' BIT practice
thus constitutes the most reliable source for tracing the impact of claims on the design of concluded BITs.
138. Argentina signed its last BIT in March 2001 with the Dominican Republic (but never
ratified it) shortly after the first investment claim was decided against Argentina in November 2000. See
Compailia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/97/3, Award (Nov. 21, 2000).
139. Int'l Inst. Sustainable Dev., South Africa Begins Withdrawing from EU-Member BITs, INv.
TREATY NEWS (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/10/30/news-in-brief-9; Ben Bland & Shawn
Donnan, Indonesia to Terminate More Than 60 Bilateral Investment Treaties, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014),
https://next.ft.com/content/3755clb2-b4e2-1 1e3-al92-00144feabdcO.
140. Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact on Investor-State Claims,
UNCTAD (Dec. 2010), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia2O16_en.pdf.
141. Sergio Puig, Does Bureaucratic Inertia Matter in Treaty Bargaining-Or, toward a Greater
Use of Qualitative Data in Empirical Legal Inquiries, 12 ST. CLARA J. INT'L L. 317 (2013) (addressing
the role of bureaucratic inertia).
142. Loewen Award, supra note 132.
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of that review was the 2004 Model BIT, which integrated NAFTA Period 3
innovations into U.S. BITs and reacted to early arbitral case law by including
targeted Period 4 innovations. 143 This radical change in U.S. policy following
investment claims can be traced in Figure 6.
At the same time, the conventional narrative focusing on the differences
between pre- and post-2004 BITs misses the mark.'" More accurately,
investment claims challenged the wisdom of having separate treaty design
preferences for BITs and FTAs. After the innovations of NAFTA, the United
States continued to use its prior model to negotiate BITs, leading to a disconnect
between its FTA investment policy and its BIT policy. Investment claims
revealed this disconnect to be untenable.
Figure 6: U.S. BIT practice and its investment claims experience
Treaties before first claim USA-URJSA-RWA
0 Treaties after first claim
0-
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Year
Note: The figure displays U.S. BITs based on their year of signature and total score of coded features
from the categories of protection, exception, and arbitration. Each treaty is color-coded based on
whether it was signed before or during the year of the first investment claim (grey) or after that date
(black).
First of all, the investment claims led the United States as a Bayesian
learner to reevaluate the likelihood of being a target in investment arbitration. As
we explained above, investment flows and stocks were symmetric under
NAFTA. NAFTA may have induced the United States to consider claims more
likely, warranting policy safeguards. Yet no equivalent symmetry existed in the
relations between the United States and its developing country BIT partners in
the 1990s. In light of asymmetric investment flows, investment claims against
the United States seemed remote under BITs and policy safeguards were
143. See Gilbert Gagn6 & Jean-Frdric Morin, The Evolving American Policy on Investment
Protection: Evidence from Recent FTAs and the 2004 Model BIT, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 357 (2006);
Vandevelde, supra note 2.
144. See, e.g., Vandevelde, supra note 2.
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unnecessary from a U.S. perspective. 145 Since the late 1990s, however, the risk
of being sued arguably has increased even in asymmetric investment relations.
Expansive interpretations of investment treaties, including notions of investor
and investment, combined with a fungible notion of capital, strategic corporate
restructuring, and more awareness of investment arbitration, have made
investment claims under any treaty more likely. 4 6 As the United States feared
becoming the target of investment claims, the differentiated approach in BITs
and NAFTA was abandoned in favor of a one-size-fits-all policy that contained
the greater policy safeguards initially developed for NAFTA.
Second, the United States may have also reacted as bounded rational
learner. The long-held belief that the United States' political and legal structures
were immune to challenge under investment treaties and that ISA would
primarily be used against developing countries with a poor rule-of-law record
was shattered by the late 1990s, as the United States itself became a target of
investment claims.1 47 Although the United States did not lose any of its early
investment cases, the use of ISA to challenge U.S. legislation corrected its
optimism bias, creating a heightened awareness that any country-irrespective
of the quality of its domestic legal system-could become a target for ISA
claims.
Third, and perhaps most important, the critical domestic debate triggered
by NAFTA claims put pressure on U.S. policy makers to "do something." 48 The
subsequent bipartisan 2002 Trade Promotion Authority legislation marked a
turning point in U.S. investment policymaking, stating that "United States
investors in the United States are not [to be] accorded lesser rights than foreign
investors in the United States" and listing several ways in which investor-state
arbitration was to be improved.1 49 Congress thereby mandated a realignment of
U.S. BIT practice with NAFTA treaty design and its lessons learned.
In conclusion, in the case of the United States, investment claims prompted
a change in the country's investment policy. Yet this change was not one from
the 1994 U.S. Model BIT to the 2004 Model. Instead, it was an alignment of FTA
and BIT practice. Increasing investment claims thus resulted in an integration of
145. Alvarez, supra note 120, at 3.
146. Several authors have pointed out that today more than one investment treaty may govern a
single investment transaction. See STEPHAN SCHILL, THE MULTLLATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAw 197-240 (2009); Barton Legum, Defining Investment and investor: Who Is Entitled to
Claim?, 22 ARB. INT'L 521, 526 (2006).
147. Alvarez, supra note 120, at 3 ("The United States could afford to assume that its laws and
practices were already consistent with the minimal standards contained in its BITs."). Prior to the rise of
investment claims against Canada and the U.S., it was a widely held assumption that investment claims
would only be raised against developing countries, since developed countries already offered adequate
protection to foreign investors. For example, JOrgen Voss stated that "an active investment protection and
promotion policy exists only in relations with Third World countries. In all the industrial countries there
is a comparable and sufficiently stable protection framework so that investments flow freely to their
optimal economic use." The Protection and Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing
Countries: Interests, Interdependencies, Intricacies, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 686, 688 (1982).
148. Kinnear & Hansen, supra note 129, at 106-09.
149. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3801 (2012); see also
Gagn6 & Morin, supra note 143, at 358-59.
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NAFTA design elements into BITs rather than a complete reinvention of U.S.
practice, as a comparison of pre- and post-arbitration BITs would suggest.
b. Canada - Innovation Following NAFTA
The Canadian case is somewhat different. Canada had already incorporated
the lessons learned from NAFTA into its BITs, reducing the later impact of
investment claims on its treaty design. The evolution of Canadian practice can
be traced in Figure 7. Canada entered the BIT universe relatively late, signing its
first BIT in 1989 with Russia. At that time, Canada followed a BIT model heavily
influenced by the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign
Property. 5 0 Early Canadian BITs were thus short and simple treaties similar in
design to BITs of European countries that had equally adopted templates
modeled on the OECD draft.1 51 Following the conclusion of NAFTA in 1992,
however, the treaty design of Canadian BITs changed drastically as innovations
from NAFTA's Investment Chapter 11 were introduced into its new BITs
(Period 3 innovation).1 52 Why Canada chose to alter its BIT design is unclear.
Bounded rational learning from investment claims can be excluded as cause,
since those claims only hit Canada later.1 53 Nor is symmetry of investment flows
a credible explanation, as the design template was applied irrespective of the
investment flows or stock of Canada's negotiation partner.154 The most
persuasive explanation is probably that decision makers considered NAFTA to
constitute an update of Canada's investment policy and asked the relevant
ministry to streamline future Canadian IIAs with NAFTA. Innovation and
diffusion of NAFTA elements thus occurred at the same time in Canadian treaty
practice.
150. Kinnear & Hansen, supra note 129, at 103.
151. SCRILL, supra note 64, at 35-36.
152. James Mcllroy, Canada's New Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement,
5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 621, 623-29 (2004).
153. The first claim was Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on
Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998). For the subsequent complaints, see NAFTA - Chapter I1-Investment: Cases
Filed Against the Government of Canada, GLOBAL AFF. CAN., http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/gov.aspx.
154. Canada's negotiating partners included a range of small countries with low levels of FDl in
Canada and minute risks of ISA claims.
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Figure 7: Canadian BIT practice and investment claims experience
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Note: The figure displays Canadian BITs based on their year of signature and total score of coded
features from the categories of protection, exception, and arbitration. Each treaty is color-coded based
on whether it was signed before or during the year of the first investment claim (grey) or after that year
(black).
The later impact of claims on investment treaty design in Canadian BIT
practice was therefore less significant. The first claim against Canada was
launched in 1997. Canada continued to sign new BITs until 1999, before it halted
its program for five years. Canada then concentrated its efforts on defending
existing claims, not concluding any new IIAs. After evaluating how Chapter 11
had performed in "real life," Canada did not abandon NAFTA treaty design.
Instead, its 2004 Model BIT, as commentators agree, closely follows NAFTA
practice.s5 5 In addition, it included Period 4 innovations in its model BIT, which
enshrines refinements and lessons learned from NAFTA litigation. Figure 7
allows us to put these changes into perspective: the gap between early Canadian
treaties modeled on OECD practice is much wider than the gap between its BITs
signed in the mid-1990s and those concluded in the 2000s. Hence, while case
law helped to refine NAFTA design architecture, the real innovation in Canada's
practice took place ten years earlier.
The case thus not only shows that innovation in BITs can take place prior
to claims, with Canada updating its BIT template following NAFTA, but also
that claims can further entrench a country in its pre-claims architecture rather
than producing radical innovation, since Canada deepened its commitment to a
NAFTA design architecture (albeit refined through clarifications induced by case
law).
155. Kinnear & Hansen, supra note 129, at 110; C61ine Lavesque, Influences on the Canadian
FIPA Model and the US Model BIT: NAFTA Chapter II and Beyond, 44 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 250
(2006).
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C. Germany - Business as Usual in Spite of Investment
Claims
In stark contrast to these North American reactions to investment claims,
Germany's BITs were unaffected by the rise of investment cases. Germany is
credited with having invented the BIT, signing the first of these agreements with
Pakistan in 1959. While the terms of its treaties have been slightly reformulated
over time, the structure of German treaties has remained remarkably constant.15 6
Figure 8 traces this consistency over time.
Figure 8: The German BIT practice and its investment claims experience
Treaties before first claim






I I I I 11
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Note: The figure displays German BITs based on their year of signature and total score of coded features
from the categories of protection, exception and arbitration. Each treaty is color-coded based on whether
it was signed before or during the year of the first investment claim (grey) or after that date (black).
At the same time, Germany, like the United States, has been the target of
investment claims. In 2000, Indian investor Ashok Sancheti initiated arbitration
pursuant to the Germany-India BIT.' 5 7 Eight years later, the Swedish company
Vattenfall filed an arbitration claim pursuant to the Energy Charter Treaty
challenging environmental permit delays and, ultimately, denials by the city of
Hamburg that impeded the construction of a coal-fired power plant.' 5 Both cases
156. The structure of its treaties is so similar that a 2013 commentary on the 2009 German model
BIT cross-references every provision to the corresponding clause in the 1959 Germany-Pakistan BIT. See
Rudolf Dolzer & Yun-1 Kim, Commentary on Germany's Model BIT (2009), in COMMENTARIES ON
SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES 289, 301 (Chester Brown & Devashish Krishan eds., 2013).
157. Luke Eric Peterson, Court Documents Reveal that Indian Investor Filed Treaty Claim
Against UK Government in 2006; Foreign Office Views UNCITRAL-based Disputes as Confidential and
Declines to Disclose Their Existence, I INV. ARB. REP. 2 (Nov. 25, 2008),
http://www.iareporter.com/downloads/20100107_13/download.
158. For a listing of German cases, see GERMAN INVESTMENT TREATY DISPUTES,
http://www.german-investment-treaty-disputes.de/Home/Index/de.
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were settled. A third investment claim also brought by Vattenfall relating to
Germany's withdrawal from nuclear energy is still pending.159
How can we explain the difference between investment claims' impact on
the United States as opposed to Germany? The key difference between them lies
in the way information relating to investment claims was handled. German cases
have been dealt with under a veil of secrecy, while in the United States a culture
of transparency emerged early on.
Until recently, arbitration rules did not mandate the publication of awards
and sometimes did not even require the disclosure of claims. The extent to which
investment claims' information entered the public domain therefore depended on
the attitudes of respondent governments. In NAFTA, the United States provided
for the possibility to make awards public (Annex 1137.4) and, in subsequent
decisions in 2001 and 2003, institutionalized public access to dispute settlement
information. 6 0 This transparency introduced investment arbitration claims into
the public sphere and thereby fueled the political debate, which led to the treaty
design changes of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT. In Germany, by contrast, investment
arbitration was kept below the public or political radar. German BITs did not
mandate the publication of dispute settlement information and the German
Ministry of Economics, in charge of negotiating BITs and defending BIT claims,
kept such information private. The Ashok Sancheti v. Germany claim of 2000,
for instance, was only revealed in 2008 through the investor and upon an inquiry
by LAReporter, an investment arbitration news provider.1 61 The terms of its
settlement still remain unknown. Similarly, the first Vattenfall case was handled
in secrecy until the terms of the settlement were disclosed in August 2010.162
Indeed, even on the inter-agency level, other ministries were scarcely involved
in BIT matters.1 63 The paradox result was that in Germany, the country that had
invented the BIT, ISA claims were almost completely unknown outside of the
Ministry of Economics, while in the United States, a latecomer to BITs, ISA
claims were hotly debated by politicians and civil society alike.
The situation in Germany changed drastically in the early 2010s.'64 First,
in 2009, competency for the conclusion of investment treaties shifted from the
159. Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12,
Notice of Arbitration (May 31, 2012).
160. See infra Section VI.B.2.b.
161. Peterson, supra note 157.
162. Nathalie Bernasconi, Background Paper on Vattenfall v. Germany Arbitration, INT'L INST.
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 2 (2009), https://intemational-arbitration-attorney.com/wp-
content/uploads/arbitrationlawbackgroundvattenfall-vs-germany.pdf("Vattenfall and Germany have
refused to comment publicly about the arbitration, so that most aspects of the case are unknown.... The
German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, which is responsible for handling the case, has
remained resolutely silent on the matter"). For the terms of the settlement, see Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall
Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/06, Award (Mar. 11, 2011).
163. See MAHINAZ MALIK, TIME FOR A CHANGE: GERMANY'S BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY
PROGRAMME AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 10 (2006) (inferring a "lack of coordination between the efforts
of the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour and the German Federal Ministry of Economic
Cooperation and Development with respect to investment").
164. See Ralph Alexander Lorz, Germany, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
and Investment-Dispute Settlement: Observations on a Paradox, 132 COLUM. FDI PERSP. (2014).
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EU member states to the EU Commission with the entry into force of the Lisbon
Treaty. 165 Taking the BIT dossier away from the handful of German Ministry of
Economics bureaucrats and passing it on to EU officials who were tasked to
create a new EU investment policy from scratch under the scrutiny of the EU
Parliament shifted the issue from the backroom into the forefront of political
attention. Second, negotiations began on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) in 2013. The TTIP was to include an investment chapter.
Anti-globalization interest groups opposing both the deal and investor-state
arbitration seized the occasion and successfully mobilized societal forces against
the TTIP to the extent that senior German politicians vowed to veto any deal
negotiated by "Brussels" that included investor-state arbitration.' 66 Finally, the
second Vattenfall claim challenging the German withdrawal from nuclear energy
provided a focal point for ISA critics. The majority of Germans has been critical
of the use of nuclear power and enthusiastically supported the government's
decision to phase out nuclear power plants. The widely publicized claim then
fueled public awareness of and opposition to ISA.167 In the course of a few years,
ISA had turned from an issue virtually unknown to one emotionally debated in
German politics and civil society.
The fact that Germans really only began in 2014 to read about those "secret
tribunals"l 68 that had been known to American audiences since 2002 helps to
explain the difference between Germany's and the United States' reaction to
investment claims. Absent such knowledge that could have fostered public and
political debate, officials in the German Ministry of Economics could proceed
with "business as usual" in bureaucratic inertia even after the country was
exposed to investment claims in the early 2000s. Therefore, the German case
shows that the impact of investment arbitration on rulemaking depends at least
in part on public awareness about investment arbitration and the extent to which
this awareness translates into political pressure that prompts decision makers to
overcome bureaucratic inertia.
d. Japan - Innovation Without Investment Claims
Japan presents an altogether different narrative. Japan has never been a
respondent in an investment case, nor has Japan experienced significant public
protest and debate over investment arbitration. Nevertheless, Japan is almost on
par with the United States and Canada in the conclusion of long and elaborate
treaties with widespread exceptions and arbitration safeguards (see Figure 9).
165. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, 92.
166. See Hans-Edzard Busemann et al., Germany to Reject EU-Canada Trade Deal:
Sueddeutsche Newspaper, REUTERS (July 26, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/26
/germany-canada-trade-idUSL6NOQIOCS20140726; see also Lorz, supra note 164.
167. See Ralf Bagner, Why Vattenfall is Taking Germany to Court, VATTENFALL NEWS (Dec. 9,
2014), http://corporate.vattenfall.com/news-and-media/news/2014/why-vattenfall-is-taking-germany-to-
court.
168. Compare Petra Pinzler, Wolfgang Uchatius & Kerstin Kohlenberg, Schattenjustiz: Im
N'amen des Geldes, DIE ZEIT (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.zeit.de/2014/10/investitionsschutz-
schiedsgericht-icsid-schattenjustiz with PBS, supra note 130.
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Japan began its investment treaty practice in 1977 when it signed its first
BIT with Egypt using a short and simple OECD treaty model.169 On the basis of
that template, eight more agreements were concluded over the next 25 years.
Then suddenly, in 2002, Japan's treaty practice changed fundamentally and the
country started to conclude what Hamamoto and Nottage call a "new generation"
of Japanese agreements.170
Hamamoto advances two explanations for this shift in treaty design. 171
First, earnings from Japanese foreign investment had become a more important
item on Japan's commercial policy agenda. While the country had been a
lukewarm supporter of BITs before, occasionally accepting offers for the
negotiations of BITs from other states, it began to formulate a more activist
investment policy agenda in order to become a "mature creditor nation," as a
later White Paper of Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade put it.1 72 Second,
prior to 2002, Japan had hoped for a multilateral agreement on investment. As
negotiations under the auspices of the OECD failed in the late 1990s and the
issue was scrapped from the WTO agenda in the early 2000s, Japan decided to
launch its investment program in earnest in order to build a web of bilateral
treaties similar to those of the United States or Europe.173
169. Agreement Between Japan and the Arab Republic of Egypt Concerning the Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Egypt-Japan, Jan. 28, 1977, 1225 U.N.T.S. 163.
170. Shotaro Hamamoto & Luke Nottage, Foreign Investment In and Out ofJapan: Economic
Backdrop, Domestic Law, and International Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Resolution (Sydney
Law Sch., Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 10/145, 2010), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract-id=1 724999.
171. Shotaro Hamamoto, A Passive Player in International Investment Law: Typically
Japanese?, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW AND PRACTICE IN ASIA 53-67
(Luke Nottage & Vivienne Bath eds., 2011).
172. Id. at 54.
173. Id. at 54-55.
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Figure 9: The Japanese BIT practice
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Note: The figure displays Japanese BITs based on their years of signatures and total score of coded
features from the categories of protection, exception, and arbitration. Each treaty is color-coded based
on whether it was signed before or during the year of the first investment claim (grey) or after that date
(black). Since Japan has not yet been respondent in an investment dispute, all its treaties are color-coded
grey.
Although Hamamato finds evidence that later Japanese BITs were adjusted
in response to developments in investment case law (see Part VI, infra), his
research suggests that investment claims had no impact on the decision to revise
Japanese BITs from 2002 onwards. First, Hamamoto points out that foreign
investment stock in Japan has been triflingly small, making claims against Japan
from foreign investors unlikely. 74 Second, post-2002 Japanese BITs became
more rather than less protective of foreign investors than their pre-2002
counterparts.' Instead of limiting Japan's exposure to claims, post-2002 BITs
expanded exposure by adding pre-establishment national and MFN treatments
and the prohibition of performance requirements. 176 Third, together with
concluding new BITs, Japan also began signing FTAs with investment
chapters.1 77 In an effort to catch up with its North American competitors, Japan
followed their lead and incorporated NAFTA treaty design elements. Drawing
closely from North American treaty language, Japan incorporated the
aforementioned pre-establishment features coupled with other Period 3 clauses
and Period 4 innovations into its IIAs.' 7 8
In conclusion, although the radical treaty design shift in 2002 coincided
with proliferating investment claims, the claims themselves had little to do with
174. Id. at 60.
175. Id. at 53-54.
176. See Hamamoto & Nottage, supra note 170, at 22-23.
177. Id. at 9-10.
178. See Alschner, supra note 73 (discussing the Americanization of investment policy,
including with respect to Japan).
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Japan's decision to revise its treaty template. Instead, the country sought to
update its treaty practice in light of a changing commercial policy agenda and in
response to a transition from multilateral to bilateral international economic
diplomacy.
D. Conclusion: Status Quo Bias Rather than Backlash Against
Arbitration
Our empirical findings suggest that the impact of investment claims is
considerably smaller than expected. The vivid and well-known example of the
United States updating its BIT design following investment claims seems to be
the exception rather than the rule, and even there, claims merely prompted an
alignment between FTA and BIT practice rather than reinvention of investment
policy from scratch. The case of Canada and Japan suggests that investment
claims sometimes play hardly any role in the diffusion of treaty design
innovation. In Canada, claims further entrenched a pre-arbitration design refined
through case law-induced clarifications. In Japan, domestic and international
economic policy developments were more important drivers for a change in BIT
design than claims. Finally, the distinction between the experience of the United
States and that of Germany shows that being hit by an investment claim may not
be enough to trigger treaty changes: transparency, public awareness, and political
momentum are needed to translate investment claims into policy responses.
Absent such an impact, the tendency of investment negotiators is to continue
with "business as usual."
The findings of this Part have three major implications for the current legal
debate on how states have responded and how they should respond to the growth
of investment claims.
1. No Backlash Against Investment Arbitration
First, our findings suggest that the idea that countries react to investment
claims by rebalancing their treaties is only partially accurate. The most
significant act of rebalancing in the history of investment treaties so far actually
predates investment claims: in NAFTA, the contracting states anticipated rather
than reacted to investment claims by designing a new investment treaty
architecture, which subsequently spread widely within the HA universe. NAFTA
itself was instrumental to its own diffusion, because it gave rise to the first wave
of investment claims and awards. These claims and awards entrenched NAFTA's
treaty design as tested and tried language that could be taken up by subsequent
treaty-makers across the globe. While investment claims did play a part in this
diffusion, other factors-such as public knowledge, symmetric FDI flows,
changing commercial policies, and the interaction of trade and investment
disciplines in FTAs-have proven at least as decisive in shaping treaty design
outcomes.
The relatively weak impact of investment claims can be viewed as a
positive sign: we have not seen an opportunistic reaction from states in the face
of rising investment claims. Developed countries did not overhaul their treaty
50 [Vol. 42: 1
2017] The Impact ofInvestment Arbitration on Investment Treaty Design 51
design to escape liability once investment claims spread or once they became
subject to them. Instead, we see that states faced with investment claims stood
their ground and implemented fine-grained adjustments in the 2000s. Rather than
an opportunistic backlash against arbitration, states showcased a strategic long-
term commitment to the investment arbitration architecture first devised in
NAFTA and refined thereafter.
2. Status Quo Bias and Anchoring in a Pre-ISA Architecture
The insight that today's treaty design is still shaped by an architecture that
predates the surge of investment claims may also be a source of concern.
Resisting temptation to make self-serving change is one thing; sticking to your
guns when change is needed is quite another. As this Section has highlighted,
investment law suffers from status quo bias: path dependency dominates over
prolific innovation. Treaty design evolution, where it takes place, consists of
states opting into and refining tried and tested language rather than trying out
something new. This path dependency prevents more radical change, even where
this change may be on balance beneficial.179
Investment claims have exposed some of the IIA system's weaknesses.
Mass claims by investors and bondholders in the wake of economic crises, treaty
and forum shopping, and strategic corporate restructuring and litigation were all
issues scarcely contemplated when the pre-ISA claim architecture was
designed.1 8 0 Additionally, concerns about inconsistent decisions by tribunals and
conflicts of interests among arbitrators are now widespread.181 Seen in this light,
it seems disconcerting that investment claims have led to an entrenchment and
refinement of the original NAFTA architecture rather than triggering more
fundamental reforms.
Such reforms may now be under way. For instance, the mentioned proposal
by the EU to replace investment arbitration with an investment court may be a
viable design alternative that breaks with path dependency. However, IA
reformers should start by identifying what is wrong with the current system
before endorsing ways to fix it. What would the investment regime look like if
we could rid ourselves of its path-dependent baggage and redesign it from scratch
today? What are investment treaties supposed to achieve in our twenty-first-
century world? What purpose do they serve? We must answer these questions
before we can determine where we can build on and where we need to depart
from path dependency.
179. See Wolfgang Alschner, Locked-in Language: Historical Sociology and the Path
Dependency of Investment Treaty Design, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Moshe Hirsch & Andrew Lang, eds., forthcoming 2017) (providing an in-depth
discussion of IIA path dependency).
180. UNCTAD has consistently documented these novel developments in its annual reports on
investor-state arbitration. See, e.g., Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, UNCTAD
(Apr. 2014), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3-en.pdf; Recent Developments
in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, UNCTAD (May 2013), http://unctad.orgIen/PublicationsLibrary
/webdiaepcb20l3d3_en.pdf.
181. See, e.g., UNCTAD, supra note 30, at 88.
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3. Transparency as Precondition for Policy Change
Finally, transparency and access to information concerning ISA is a crucial
ingredient for any such policy change. In light of bureaucratic inertia, pressure
for change is unlikely to come from within responsible ministries. Therefore,
broad access to investment claim related information is necessary to raise public
awareness, trigger public debates, and guide public choices. Current
developments from broad transparency clauses in newly negotiated treaties-
such as the TPP-to parallel efforts to enhance transparency in arbitration under
already existing IIAs through the Mauritius Convention are encouraging.182 if
ratified and widely accepted, these trends towards more transparency promise to
be an effective antidote against status quo bias, path dependency, and
bureaucratic inertia by enhancing the impact of investment claims on the
domestic policy discourse.
VI. THE IMPACT OF ARBITRATION AWARDS ON RULEMAKING
While investment claims have had only a limited impact on treaty design,
the influence of case law developments on treaty-making is more pronounced.
As we hypothesized in Part I, the parallel judge-made law in arbitration may
cause states to make changes in their investment treaties. In this Part, we briefly
describe how we can identify the causal influence of ISA awards and then
proceed to investigate the impact of case law on procedural and substantive treaty
design innovations through several case studies. Importantly, the ambition of this
Part is not to comprehensively map the interaction between case law and treaty-
making-which would require many volumes-but rather to show that
investment awards, in contrast to clauses or claims, play a systematic role in
shaping investment treaty design.
A. Identifying the Impact ofArbitral Case Law
Investment arbitrators exercise an implied interpretive power as part of
their adjudicatory function. 183 In exercising that power, tribunals can impact
future treaty design in two major ways. First, arbitrators may fill gaps left open
by the drafters, providing a solution or "focal point" to a normative void that is
later codified in subsequent investment treaties. Second, arbitrators may interpret
existing provisions in a way unintended by the contracting parties, prompting
states to correct the perceived misinterpretation in future treaties.
How can we causally attribute a change in treaty design to a development
in investment case law? Investment awards only began to spread in the early
2000s. That means that only Period 4 innovations could have been caused by
arbitral decisions. In Table I in Section III.B, we identified both substantive and
procedural changes introduced in that period. By looking at these treaty design
182. United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration,
G.A. Res. 69/116, U.N. Doc. A/68/496 (Dec. 10, 2014, not yet in force).
183. Roberts, supra note 56, at 180.
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changes in their legal context, we can investigate whether they are related to
parallel developments in investment case law.184
In considering the legal context of treaty innovations, we do not need to
limit our analysis to cases rendered against the country that first introduced a
treaty design innovation. We instead assume that countries learn from awards
rendered generally. There are several reasons for the merit of this assumption.
First of all, as we discussed above, tribunals cite previous awards that are not
limited to cases involving the same IIA. 185 Hence, awards rendered against any
state A, B, or C can affect outcomes in a case against state D in similar ways as
a prior unrelated award against state D. Second, states are unlikely to react to a
single unwanted arbitral decision by changing their future treaties, but rather
react to lines of jurisprudence. Due to the ad hoc nature of investment arbitration
with its changing pools of arbitrators, decisions can vary in quality,
interpretation, and outcome. 186 When a particular arbitral decision falls short on
any of these fronts (from the contracting states' perspectives), the host country
may file for the annulment or setting aside of the award, and the home state may
openly criticize the arbitral tribunal, as has happened on occasion.' 87 Only if a
controversial decision develops into a line of jurisprudence, which might affect
the outcome of future cases, are contracting states likely to respond by taking
sides in interpretive debates through their treaty-making. Therefore, we believe
it is justified to look at developments in the entire body of arbitral decisions to
find an impact on specific treaty design innovations.18 8
Thus, if we expect that states take sides in major debates about how
prominent treaty norms are to be interpreted or practical procedural questions are
to be resolved, how can we tell whether a given treaty design change is caused
by a development in case law and not the result of another factor? A treaty design
change is caused by a development in case law when it cannot be explained
outside of its legal context. For example, preventing MFN from applying to
dispute settlement provisions presupposes a legal controversy on the scope of
MFN. Similarly, the clarification that the minimum standard of treatment refers
to customary international law would be unnecessary but for the interpretive
disagreement on the content of that provision. As we shall see through several
184. Indeed, this seems to be the methodology adopted in an UNCTAD study, although
UNCTAD's treatment of contextual arbitral disagreement and treaty design changes is somewhat
disjointed. See UNCTAD, supra note 4.
185. See supra Section I.B.3.
186. This built-in inconsistency is the primary reason why some scholars are skeptical about the
feasibility and desirability of an investment appeal mechanism. See generally APPEALS MECHANISM IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Karl P. Sauvant & Michael Chiswick-Patterson eds., 2008).
187. In 2003, for instance, Switzerland sent a letter to the ICSID Secretariat complaining about
the SGS v. Pakistan tribunal, criticizing the narrow meaning it gave to the umbrella clause in the
Switzerland-Pakistan BIT which "runs counter to the intention of Switzerland." The letter is reprinted in
its relevant parts in ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUiS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 466-467 (2009); see also Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Non-
Disputing State Submissions in Investment Arbitration: Resurgence of Diplomatic Protection?, in
DIPLOMATIC AND JUDICIAL MEANS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 307,315 (Marcelo Kohen et al. eds., 2012).
188. Future research may investigate whether this assumption holds true as an empirical matter.
Involvement in a case that includes a controversial interpretation may affect the propensity of a state to
react to this same interpretation in future treaty practice. Such research would shed light on whether states
are Bayesian or bounded rational leamers when it comes to digesting case law.
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case studies, substantive innovations can only be meaningfully explained
through their case law context, while procedural changes may have been caused
by other factors as well.
B. Case Studies ofInvestment Treaty Changes Induced by Case Law
To assess the degree to which case law shapes treaty design, we link
substantive and procedural innovations to developments in investment
arbitration through several case studies. We do not, however, systematically
investigate what factors drive the subsequent diffusion of these innovations,
merely noting that such diffusion does take place.
1. Substantive Refinements
With respect to the substantive innovations of Period 4, a strong link exists
between arbitral decisions and treaty design changes. In Table 1, we identified
several treaty design changes that relate to the clarification of four core elements:
(1) the notion of investment, (2) the scope of indirect expropriation, (3) the
content of FET, and (4) the reach of the MFN principle. These four elements
have spread across the IIA universe, with investment, expropriation, and FET
definition innovations existing in almost every second, newly concluded IIA in
2014. Through a set of case studies, we show that each of these Period 4
innovations can be linked to debates in arbitral case law. Each debate began with
a controversial case and later inspired awards that adamantly followed or rejected
the interpretation advanced therein. These lines of jurisprudence then triggered a
reaction by states, which manifested as treaty design adjustments in newly
concluded agreements.
a. Salini - Defining the Notion ofInvestment
The definition of investment has generated much interpretive quarrel. An
asset must qualify as an "investment" under an IIA to benefit from the treaty's
protection. For investment arbitration, the existence of an investment is a
threshold requirement that must be met in order to establish a tribunal's
jurisdiction ratione materiae. The concept of investment is thus central to the
treaty architecture. The ICSID Convention, which provides the framework for
most investment arbitrations, simply states in Article 25(1) that the "jurisdiction
of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an
investment" without clarifying the term.189 IAs, in turn, predominantly defined
investment as "every type of asset" including, but not limited to, an illustrative
list of specifically mentioned assets such as movable and immovable property,
shares, and intellectual property rights, but also claims to money or performance.
Hence, the notion of investment remained vaguely defined.
As a result, divergent interpretations developed in case law to give meaning
to the term and its outer limits. On one extreme, a line of cases emerged following
Fedex v. Venezuela (1997) and Salini v. Morocco (2001) according to which a
189. ICS[D Convention, supra note 14, at art. 25(1).
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transaction has to satisfy four cumulative requirements to qualify as an
investment ("Salini criteria"): (1) commitment of capital, (2) certain duration, (3)
assumption of risk, and (4) a contribution to the host state's development.1 90 At
its high point, the annulment committee in Mitchell v. Congo (2006) struck down
an award for assuming jurisdiction when the underlying investment-an
American law firm in the Democratic Republic of Congo-did not contribute to
the host state's development, thus failing to meet the Salini criteria. 191 On the
other extreme, the annulment committee in Malaysian Salvors v. Malaysia
(2009) denied the existence of such investment criteria and annulled an award
that had applied them. It instead held that the term "investment" excludes simple
sale contracts, but does not have any intrinsic meaning absent a definition by the
contracting or disputing parties.' 92
To counteract the uncertainty and divergence characterizing the case law,
states began to clarify the notion of investment in their treaties. The U.S.-
Uruguay BIT (2005) was the first BIT to explicitly stipulate in Article 1 that "an
investment means every asset . . . that has the characteristics of an investment,
including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources,
the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk." 93 The U.S.-Uruguay
BIT formulation includes some of the Salini criteria, but notably does not
mention the contribution to host state development. At the same time, it is more
restrictive than what the Malaysian Salvors annulment committee deemed to be
the ICSID default rule. Hence, the clarifying language, which has since been
diffused to other treaties, occupies a middle ground between the extreme
positions taken in case law.' 94
190. Salini Construttori S.P.A. & flastrade S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001); Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID
Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 43 (July 11, 1997).
191. Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7,
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Award, IN 30-33, 39, 48 (Nov. 1, 2006).
192. Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, In 71-72 (Apr. 16, 2009).
193. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., art. 1, Nov. 4, 2005,
44 I.L.M. 268 [hereinafter U.S.-Uruguay BIT].
194. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Republic of Guatemala and the Republic of Trinidad and
Tobago on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Guat.-Trin. & Tobago, Aug. 13, 2013,
UNCTAD INV. POL'Y HUB; Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
People's Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-China, Sept.
9, 2012, 14 ICSID INv. TREATIES 2015-2; Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Colombia for
the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment, Colom.-Japan, Sept. 12, 2011, UNCTAD INv.
POL'Y HUB; Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Egypt-Switz., June 7, 2010, 14 ICSID INV.
TREATIES 2015-3; Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment Between the
Government of the Republic of Austria and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Austria-Kaz.,
Jan. 12, 2010, UNCTAD INv. POL'Y HUB; Agreement Between Japan and the Republic of Peru for the
Promotion, Protection and Liberalisation of Investment, Japan-Peru, Nov. 22, 2008, 2808 U.N.T.S. 1;
Agreement Between the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the Republic
of India on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, India-Mex., May 21, 2007, 2553 U.N.T.S. 103.
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b. Ethyl/Methanex - Drawing a Line Between Indirect
Expropriation and General Regulations
Early NAFTA cases gave rise to an intense legal and public debate as to
whether a state has to compensate foreign investors if, by virtue of general
regulatory measures, part of the investor's business becomes practically
worthless. The issue first arose in the case Ethyl Corp. v. Canada and was fully
litigated in the Methanex v. United States dispute. 195 In both instances, a province
or state had passed legislation that effectively banned the use of certain gasoline
additives due to health reasons and in both cases parts of the businesses of the
producers of these substances suffered losses that were claimed to be tantamount
to an outright expropriation. Most investment treaties, including NAFTA, protect
investors against indirect expropriation, i.e., those measures that involve no
formal taking of assets but effectively deprive an investor of the value associated
with its assets.
In its 2005 award, the Methanex tribunal resolved the case by
distinguishing between expropriatory measures mandating compensation and
general bona fide regulations not giving rise to compensation. The tribunal stated
that "as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for
a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which
affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory
and compensable . . .. "196 The tribunal thereby effectively adopted the legal
standard advanced in the United States's written submissions.197 Yet, absent a
clear textual carve-out in the treaty, there was a risk that another arbitral tribunal
would disagree with the Methanex award and not read a BIT's clause on
expropriation in light of the underlying customary international rules. In
response, the United States began inserting a clarifying annex to its newly
concluded treaties, and other countries followed suit. The U.S.-Uruguay BIT
(2005), for instance, states in Annex B that the treaty's expropriation clause "is
intended to reflect customary international law concerning the obligation of
States with respect to expropriation" and that "[e]xcept in rare circumstances,
non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations." 98
195. Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998);
Methanex Partial Award and Methanex Final Award, supra note 133.
196. Methanex Final Award, supra note 133, at Part IV, Chapter D, 1 7. See also SAUR
International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Liability, IT 396-401 (June 6,2012); El Paso Energy International Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶¶ 236-240 (Oct. 31, 2011); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America,
UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 354 (June 8, 2009).
197. Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Amended Statement of Defense
of Respondent United States of America, In 409-13 (Dec. 5, 2003).
198. U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 193, at annex B.
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c. Pope & Talbot - FET as Additive to the Customary
International Law Minimum Standard
All early NAFTA tribunals struggled with giving meaning to NAFTA
Article 1105, entitled "Minimum Standard of Treatment," which states in
paragraph one that "[e]ach Party shall accord to investments of investors of
another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security."199 The Metalclad v. Mexico
tribunal read the provision as mandating a general duty of transparency toward
foreign investors.200 Considering this interpretation as an excess of power, the
Supreme Court of British Columbia partially annulled the award a year later. 201
The S.D. Myers v. Canada tribunal found that a tribunal should assess
compliance of a state with international law generally under NAFTA Article
1105, and that a finding of violation of another intemational norm would weigh
heavily toward finding a breach of Article 1105.202 Most disturbing for NAFTA
parties, however, seems to have been the Pope & Talbot v. Canada award.
Openly disagreeing with the position advanced by the United States through a
NAFTA 1128 non-disputing party submission, the tribunal adopted what it called
an "additive" interpretation that ascribed a protective scope to the FET clause
beyond the customary international law minimum standard of treatment.203
In July 2001, the NAFTA parties reacted. Representatives of the three
NAFTA states issued an authoritative interpretation through the NAFTA Free
Trade Commission (FTC), pursuant to Article 1131(2), clarifying that NAFTA
Article 1105 does not require treatment above or beyond the customary
intemational law minimum standard of treatment.20 According to Todd Weiler,
the NAFTA parties thereby sought to remedy the "'mistakes' which their lawyers
told them were being made by the tribunals."2 05 Whether or not the statement
merely clarified or effectively amended NAFTA is subject to an unresolved
debate. 206 What is clear, however, is that NAFTA parties were so convinced that
this reading of fair and equitable treatment is the proper one that they integrated
the explicit customary international law minimum standard references also in
their subsequent treaties. Since 2002, over 40 newly concluded BITs contain
explicit references linking FET to the customary international law minimum
standard.207
199. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1105, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
200. Metalclad Award, supra note 131, 176.
201. United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp. (2001), 2001 B.C.S.C. 664 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.).
202. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶M 263-64 (Nov.
13, 2000).
203. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits, I 110-
17 (Apr. 10, 2001).
204. NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, supra note 57, § B(2).
205. Todd Weiler, Metalclad v. Mexico: A Play in Three Parts, 2 J. WORLD INV. 685,704 (2001).
206. See Brower, supra note 57; Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 57.
207. In fact, this is not limited to the NAFTA parties. See, e.g., Agreement Between the
Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Republic of Tanzania Concerning the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Tanz.-Turk., Mar. 11, 2011, UNCTAD INV. POL'Y
HUB; Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Government of
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, St.
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d. Maffezini - Guarding Against the Application of MFN
Clauses to Dispute Settlement
One of the most controversial cases in investment law's history, Maffezini
v. Spain, also triggered changes in treaty practice. In Maffezini, the tribunal
allowed an investor to circumvent an obligatory pre-arbitration waiting period in
the Spain-Argentina BIT by using MIFN to claim the more favorable treatment
granted in the BIT between Spain and Chile, where such a requirement was
absent.2 08 Subsequent investors have followed the Maffezini strategy of invoking
MIFN to overcome similarly unfavorable admissibility requirements in their base
treaty or to outright ground a tribunal's jurisdiction in MFN where the original
treaty's consent to arbitration is too narrow.209
The Maffezini legacy produced a divide in case law and scholarship. While
some tribunals have allowed investors' requests to access more favorable
admissibility or even jurisdictional conditions for arbitration claims, others have
rejected it.210 One of the central issues in this debate has been where the
presumption lies. Do states have to explicitly limit the scope of MFN to prevent
circumvention of the dispute settlement architecture set up in a treaty? Or are
MFN clauses subject to inherent limitations that prevent investors from accessing
more favorable dispute settlement terms in third treaties? To remedy this
uncertainty, several BITs have specifically circumscribed the scope of MFN
clauses. The Belgium-Colombia BIT (2009), for instance, provides in Article
V(3): "The most favourable treatment ... does not encompass mechanisms for
the settlement of investment disputes, such as those contained in Articles XII and
XIII of this Agreement, which are provided for in treaties or international
investment agreements." 211 Several states have followed suit.2 1 2 Most recently,
such a clarification has also been introduced in the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement at Article 9.5(3).213
Vincent-Taiwan, Dec. 17, 2009, UNCTAD INV. POL'Y HUB; Agreement Between Japan and the Lao
People's Democratic Republic for the Liberalisation, Promotion and Protection of Investment, Japan-
Laos, Jan. 16, 2008, 2779 U.N.T.S. 85.
208. Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of
the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction IM 38-98 (Jan. 25, 2000).
209. J. A. Maupin, MFN-based Jurisdiction in Investor-State Arbitration: Is There Any Hope for
a Consistent Approach?, 14 J. INT'L ECON. L. 157 (2011).
210. See Yannick Radi, The Application of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause to the Dispute
Settlement Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Domesticating the "Trojan Horse," 18 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 757, 765-71 (2007); id.
211. Agreement Between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union and The Republic of
Colombia on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Belg.-Colom., art. V(3), Apr. 2,
2009, UNCTAD INv. POL'Y HUB.
212. See e.g., Agreement Between Japan and The Republic of Iraq for the Promotion and
Protection of Investment, Iraq-Japan, Jun. 7,2012, UNCTAD INv. POL'Y HUB; Agreement Between Japan
and The Republic of Colombia for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investment, Colom.-
Japan, Sept. 12,2011, UNCTAD INV. POL'Y HUB; Agreement Between The Swiss Confederation and the
Arab Republic of Egypt on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Egypt-Switz., Jun.
7, 2010, 14 ICSID INV. TREATIES 2015-3.
213. Trans-Pacific Partnership, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text.
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2. Procedural Innovations
What these substantive innovations have in common is that they cannot be
convincingly explained devoid of their case law context. As a result, we can infer
that they have been caused by debates in investment case law. The case of
procedural changes introduced in Period 4 is more ambiguous. On the one hand,
we do see changes being driven by the same desire to correct arbitral
misinterpretations that prompted the substantive innovations observed. In
addition, we can also trace how arbitral decisions may have inspired the
normative solutions later adopted by the treaty makers. On the other hand, the
emergence and diffusion of these procedural elements are also likely to have
been shaped by causal factors outside of the courtroom.
a. Pope & Talbot - Enhancing Control Mechanisms
The foregoing substantive controversies arguably not only impacted
substantive treaty design changes, but also highlighted procedural issues
involving the allocation of power between arbitral tribunals and state parties.
The above-mentioned FTC interpretive note and the Pope & Talbot
tribunal is a case in point. Following the NAFTA FTC interpretation, Canada
argued in Pope & Talbot v. Canada that a tribunal must accept such a statement
by the FTC at face value and abide by it as binding pursuant to NAFTA Article
1131(2).214 The Pope & Talbot tribunal disagreed and proceeded to review
whether the statement was indeed an interpretation or, rather, an amendment of
NAFTA.21 5 Although it ultimately accepted the interpretation as binding, it
voiced concern about the contracting parties changing the law retroactively in an
ongoing proceeding and leaned towards characterizing the statement as an
amendment of NAFTA.2 16 The case thus raised a fundamental question of
delegation; how much control do contracting states still have over arbitral
tribunals after bestowing them with adjudicatory and interpretive authority
within their treaties?
Some of the procedural innovations of Period 4 can be viewed as reactions
to this debate. An explicit provision on preliminary objections is a form of ex
ante control, as it specifies the procedure in the treaty itself rather than leaving it
to the disputants and the discretion of arbitral tribunals. A comment procedure
on draft awards and the possibility to create an appeal mechanism are forms of
ex post controls, which allow contracting states to seek a correction of an arbitral
misinterpretation.
At the same time, the causal connection between specific awards or debates
in arbitration and procedural treaty design changes is much less clear and direct,
as was the case for the aforementioned substantive changes. The inclusion of
preliminary measures can also be explained by states' desires to more easily
214. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award in Respect of Damages,
¶22 (May 31, 2002).
215. Id. at ¶M 24-47.
216. Id. at ¶f 47-51.
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defend against investment claims by being able to address frivolous claims early
on in a proceeding. Similarly, commenting on draft awards and creating an
appeal mechanism may not be so much about keeping a single tribunal in check,
but more about achieving consistency and predictability in arbitration on a
systemic level. Hence, while arbitral caselaw, either through specific awards or
in their totality, seem to have contributed to influencing the outcomes of
procedural innovations, the causal link is more tenuous; other considerations are
at play that could have equally caused or contributed to such innovation.
b. Metalclad and Methanex - Transparency in Arbitration
A second way that arbitral decisions may have made an impact on
procedural innovations is by serving as focal points for subsequent treaty-
making. In contrast to the substantive Period 4 refinements, which relate to vague
but existing clauses, some of the issues covered by procedural Period 4
innovations were simply not contained in previous treaties. Consider the issue of
transparency in arbitration, which regroups the Period 4 innovations of amicus
curiae submissions, the confidentiality of arbitral documents and the possibility
of open hearings. The text of Chapter 11 provides no clear guidance on these
three procedural points.2 17 Consequently, early NAFTA tribunals, when first
confronted with these issues, had to find solutions on their own. These NAFTA
tribunals send a message in favor of greater transparency in investment
arbitration: the Metalclad tribunal allowed the publication of dispute-related
information,21 8 and the Methanex tribunal accepted amicus curiae submissions
and conducted open hearings for the first time. 219
Subsequent treaty practice closely followed these early arbitral decisions.
In two successive statements in 2001 and 2003, the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission committed the NAFTA states to making all documents relating to
ISA cases public, subject to redaction of confidential information,220 and
clarified that a tribunal is allowed to accept amicus curiae submissions. 22 1 In
post-2004 treaties, Canada and the United States then regulated the admission of
third-party interventions, publication of documents, and open hearings explicitly,
incorporating the lessons learned from NAFTA.222
It is tempting to view these earlier NAFTA decisions as creating "focal
points" that caused subsequent treaty makers to endorse the tribunals' view in
217. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes-Adoption,
Adaptation, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 KANS. L. REv. 1339, 1364-65 (2005); see also OECD,
Transparency and Third Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement Procedures (OECD,
Working Papers on Int'l Inv., No. 2005/1, 2005).
218. Metalclad Corp. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Decision
on a Request by the Respondent for an Order Prohibiting the Claimant from Revealing Information (Oct.
27, 1997) [hereinafter Metalclad Decision on Revealing Information].
219. Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on
Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as "amici curiae" (Jan. 15, 2001). The hearings were opened
through live broadcasts.
220. See NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, supra note 57, § A(2)(b).
221. NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing
Party Participation (Oct. 7, 2003).
222. L6vesque, supra note 155, at 268.
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their subsequent practice. Yet a range of causal factors seems to have been at
play, making it difficult to evaluate the impact of these early arbitral decisions.
First, discussions inside the courtroom were accompanied by external debates as
public interest groups and critics of Chapter 11 campaigned against the "secrecy"
of NAFTA tribunals, thus putting pressure on NAFTA states to ensure greater
transparency in adjudication. 223
Second, disagreement among the NAFTA parties was also a major
impediment to innovation. During NAFTA negotiations, Mexico had already
resisted a clause allowing the publication of awards, while Canada and the United
States agreed to it in Annex 1137.4 of NAFTA. Mexico also fought against the
publication of arbitration-related information in Metalclad2 24 and intervened in
Methanex as non-disputing parties arguing against a tribunals' capacity to
receive amicus submissions, 225 while both Canada and the United States favored
greater transparency. Mexico then changed its position step-by-step. Mexico first
agreed to the publications of documents and amicus submissions in the two FTC
notes mentioned above, and in 2004 joined an earlier statement by the United
States and Canada to open hearings in arbitration disputes. 226 Whether this
change of heart was induced by the transparency-favoring arbitral decisions or
by pressure from its NAFTA partners or domestic constituencies is unclear.
Hence, the causal impact of early arbitral decision on transparency
innovations is uncertain. On the one hand, they are likely to have facilitated the
transition towards more transparency in arbitration and may even have furnished
"focal points" for the states to deal with the issue in subsequent treaties. On the
other hand, factors outside of the courtroom shaped the countries' position on the
issue as well, which makes it difficult to ascertain the effect induced by arbitral
decisions alone.
This Section has shown that investment case law has a systematic impact
on investment treaty design. The innovation and diffusion of substantive treaty
design features can be linked to specific normative debates in case law. What
these substantive changes have in common is that they strive to refine treaty
standards rather than reinventing them. They often take the guise of explanatory
footnotes or annexes to avoid the impression that they deviate from prior treaty
practice. Their tenor is thus that the original treaty content has not been altered,
but merely clarified by correcting arbitral misinterpretation. Similarly,
223. Kinnear& Hansen, supra note 129, at 106-09; see also Ralph Nader& Lori Wallach, GATT
NAFTA, and the Subversion of the Democratic Process, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
92 (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 2001).
224. See Metalclad Decision on Revealing Information, supra note 218.
225. Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, First Submission of Mexico
Pursuant to Art. 1128, [ 15 (Nov. 10, 2000).
226. See Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations, U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Oct. 7, 2003), http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/TradeAgreements/Regional
/NAFTA/assetuploadjfilel 43_3602.pdf, NAFTA Free Trade Commission Joint Statement: A Decade of
Achievement, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (July 16, 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/archive
/DocumentLibrary/Press -Releases/2004/July/NAFTAFreeTradeCommission-Joint Statement -
A_DecadeofAchievement.html; Statement of Canada on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven
Arbitrations, GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-
accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alenalopen-hearing.aspx.
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procedural innovations can often be associated with developments in case law,
although a causal connection is more difficult to establish since a number of
factors may be responsible for the procedural changes observed. Nevertheless,
of the three factors-clauses, claims and cases-considered, investment case law
seems to have the most significant effect on treaty design.
CONCLUSION
Contributing to the burgeoning computational analysis of international
investment law, this Article has used state-of-the-art information extraction
techniques to empirically investigate the effects of investor-state arbitration on
treaty design. It has shown that the impact of arbitration on investment
rulemaking is surprisingly small. Both investment clauses and investment claims
do not systematically trigger material changes in IA design. In contrast, arbitral
case law does exert a traceable influence on investment treaties. States thus
behave somewhat counter-intuitively: they do not adjust their agreements in light
of major legal events like the inclusion of investment clauses starting in the 1960s
or their widespread use in practice from the late 1990s onwards, yet they are
shaken by small and technical developments in investment arbitration to which
they feel compelled to respond.
There is logic to this apparent paradox. This logic has less to do with the
magnitude of extraneous changes in investment arbitration and more with the
lawyers observing, digesting, and reacting to them in national ministries. As this
research suggests, investment lawyers cherish the path-dependent predictability
of tried and tested legal language. Such predictability is more at risk of being
unhinged by a growth of conflicting interpretations in arbitral case law, than by
a new enforcement route of investment obligations or the fact that investment
claims have been launched pursuant to a treaty. Thus, we observe countries like
Germany continuing business as usual in the face of investment claims, and
countries like the United States, Canada, and Japan entrenching and refining their
treaty design based on pre-arbitration templates rather than rethinking their
agreements from scratch.
This means that in order to explain treaty design changes, researchers must
take account of the variety of cognitive, social, and political factors impacting
investment treaty-making on the national and international level. This Article has
highlighted that bureaucratic inertia, symmetry in underlying investment
relations, or public awareness are often more decisive for the absence or presence
of legal innovation and diffusion than the raw developments in investment
arbitration. The Article has also shown that a mixed method approach combining
computational, quantitative and qualitative analyses is particularly suitable to
disentangle these different factors empirically.
For investment arbitrators, this study suggests that a state-centric rather
than an investor-centric reading of substantive investment provisions is
warranted. Empirically, investor-state arbitration is a mere procedural add-on
that leaves the treaties' protective obligations untouched. IIAs are thus not like
contracts for the benefits of third parties and should not be read as such. Instead,
they are inter-state promises that sometimes can and sometimes cannot be
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enforced through ISA. Since their enforcement route exists independently of the
rest of the treaty, we should not let it overshadow the reading of substantive treaty
standards and should instead treat HAs more like other public international
treaties.
For other investment stakeholders, this research suggests that they should
be more concerned about states not changing their treaties when change is needed
than about investment lawyers overreacting to developments in arbitration.
While more radical change may be on the horizon, thus far we have primarily
seen a reproduction and entrenchment of what is essentially a pre-ISA
architecture. We thus need more rather than less reaction to investment
arbitration. At the same time, careful reflection on what investment treaties are
to achieve in today's world has to precede any change in treaty design so to guide
our judgment as to where we need to depart from and where we need to continue
with established practice.
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ANNEX
A. Coding Procedure
Using international investment law textbooks and treaties, we identified 55
treaty features relating to (1) investment protection, (2) public policy exceptions
and clarifications, and (3) ex ante and ex post controls of contracting states over
the arbitration process. The list of features is detailed in the table below. For each
of these 55 treaty features selected, we identified key words uniquely associated
with each feature (e.g. key word "expropriat" denoting the concept of
"expropriation"), carefully accounting for variation in a clause's wording.
For example, one of the most important clauses in investment treaties is the
"fair and equitable treatment" standard. Some treaties, however, refer to
"equitable and reasonable treatment" instead. The Parkerings v. Lithuania
tribunal held that both terms are to be understood synonymously.22 7 Since similar
variations can be observed for virtually all features investigated, we compiled a
list of possible variations per treaty feature. To verify the quality of the keyword
approach, we went through rounds of coding and verification of results to
gradually improve precision (accounting for false positives) and recall
(accounting for false negatives). The considerable uniformity of investment
treaty language helped significantly to keep the list of keywords per feature low.
In total, our dictionary comprises over 200 keywords and phrases for the 55
treaty features investigated.
This dictionary of key terms is subsequently automatically run through the
dataset of HAs using the programming language Python. If a given element from
the dictionary of terms appears in a treaty, it is coded as 1. If the element does
not appear, it is coded as a 0. For FTAs, only investment chapters are analyzed.
Where a detailed comparison of two FTAs was required, such as in Part III
comparing Australian FTAs before and after the policy decision to exclude ISA,
we also manually checked the financial service and exception chapters to ensure
accuracy.
227. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award,
IM 198, 278 (Sept. 11, 2007).
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Arbitration Arbitrator Code of Conduct
Arbitration Authoritative Interpretation
Arbitration Closed List of Remedies
Arbitration Comment on Draft Award
Arbitration Commission
Arbitration Consolidation
Arbitration Existence of ISA
Arbitration Limitation Period for Claims
Arbitration Loss or Damage
Arbitration Notice of Intent
Arbitration Preliminary Objections
Arbitration Renvoi to State Parties
Arbitration State-party Participation
Arbitration Transparency of Proceedings
Arbitration Waiver of Other Proceedings
Exception Balance of Payments
Exception Bona Fide Taking Carve-out
Exception Compulsory License Carve-out
Exception Creditor Protection
Exception Culture
Exception Denial of Benefits
Exception Environmental Measures Clause
Exception Exchange Rate Measures Carve-out




Exception Indirect FET Breach Carve-out
Exception International Security Exception
Exception Investment Characteristics




Exception Prudential Measures Carve-out
Exception Regional Economic Integration Org.
Exception Security Exception
Exception Subsidies Carve-out
Protection Access to Courts
Protection Arbitrary Measures Prohibition
Protection Compensation for Losses
Protection Denial of Justice
Protection Effective Means
Protection Expropriation
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Protection Fair and Equitable Treatment




Protection Sojourn of Personnel
Protection Transfer of Funds
Protection Transparency of Local Laws
Protection Umbrella Clause
